Doug,
OK, Assume that the binaries are installed under root, but a
hacker cracks PostGres, what is to stop him/her from trashing all of the
database files in the first place? Their not owned by root. Installing
malware, whether it's actual code or destroying/defacing files causes
similar if not identical problems. At least their restricted to the
postgres user. And in my book the executables are of zero value whereas
the data files, and their contained data, are of infinite value. So
under your scheme we're protecting the least valuable part of the
system at the expense of the most valuable.
Dick Goulet
Senior Oracle DBA
Oracle Certified 8i DBA
-----Original Message-----
From: Doug Quale [mailto:quale1@charter.net]
Sent: Thursday, January 13, 2005 11:56 AM
To: PostgreSQL Admin
Subject: Re: [ADMIN] Installing PostgreSQL as "postgress" versus "root"
Debate!
"Goulet, Dick" <DGoulet@vicr.com> writes:
> to Postgres install as well. I as the DBA should be able to install,
> upgrade, etc the software without access to the root account. Simply
> put the fewer people who know the root password the fewer who can
> destroy the system and the fewer who have to be told when the password
> changes. And the fewer people who know anything, the more secure it
is.
This analysis is incomplete. Under this scheme, if someone cracks
your account they can install trojaned or malicious executables owned
by you without cracking root. The flaw is in believing that this
scheme requires an intruder to crack two accounts to defeat your
security. In fact, you have doubled the number of targets but left
the amount of work required of the bad guys to compromise your system
the same (crack one account).
Put all your eggs in one basket, and WATCH THAT BASKET.
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