> On 2 Mar 2014, at 05:20, Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com> wrote:
>
>> On Sat, Mar 01, 2014 at 05:51:46PM -0500, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
>>> On 03/01/2014 05:10 PM, Tom Lane wrote:
>>> One other thought here: is it actually reasonable to expend a lot of effort
>>> on the Windows case? I'm not aware that people normally expect a Windows
>>> box to have multiple users at all, let alone non-mutually-trusting users.
>>
>> As Stephen said, it's fairly unusual. There are usually quite a few
>> roles, but it's rare to have more than one "human" type role
>> connected to the machine at a given time.
>
> I, too, agree it's rare. Rare enough to justify leaving the vulnerability
> open on Windows, indefinitely?
It's not that rare in my experience - certainly there are far more single user installations, but Terminal Server
configurationsare common for deploying apps "Citrix-style" or VDI. The one and only Windows server maintained by the
EDBinfrastructure team is a terminal server for example.
> I'd say not. Windows itself has been pushing
> steadily toward better multi-user support over the past 15 years or so.
> Releasing software for Windows as though it were a single-user platform is
> backwards-looking. We should be a model in this area, not a straggler.
Definitely.
>
>> I'd be happy doing nothing in this case, or not very much. e.g.
>> provide a password but not with great cryptographic strength.
>
> One option that would simplify things is to fix only non-Windows in the back
> branches, via socket protection, and fix Windows in HEAD only. We could even
> do so by extending HAVE_UNIX_SOCKETS support to Windows through named pipes.
>
> Using weak passwords on Windows alone would not simplify the effort.
>
> --
> Noah Misch
> EnterpriseDB http://www.enterprisedb.com
>
>
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