> Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> writes:
>> Let me outline the simplest API, assuming we are using table-level
>> granularity for the security columns.
>> CREATE TABLE would support
>> WITH (ROWACL = TRUE/FALSE);
>> for row-level acl and:
>> WITH (SECEXT = TRUE/FALSE);
>> for SE-Linux, with 'SECEXTL' standing for SECurity EXTernal or
>> SECurity_contEXT.
>
> Wait a minute. The original argument for providing SQL-driven row level
> security was that it would help provide a framework for testing the code
> and doing something useful with it on non-selinux platforms.
Yes,
In addition, I want folks to remind that the Row-level ACLs are not designed
based on SQL standards. Thus, I called it one of the enhanced securities.
> I think there should be only *one* underlying column and that it should
> be manipulable by either SQL commands or selinux. Otherwise you're
> making a lie of the primary argument for having the SQL feature at all.
>
> It's possible that some people would want to insist that only selinux
> be used to manipulate the settings, but I think that could be addressed
> by a compile-time option to disable the SQL commands.
My original opinion is that users should be able to choose what enhanced
security mechanism is available on his system.
In all honesty, I don't understand why the Row-level ACLs has privileged
position in the enhanced securities and it should be always available.
Thanks,
--
KaiGai Kohei