On Jun 24, 2024, at 1:53 PM, Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote:
> Is "tighten up what the superuser can do" on our list of objectives?
> Personally, I think we should be focusing mostly, and maybe entirely,
> on letting non-superusers do more things, with appropriate security
> controls. The superuser can ultimately do anything, since they can
> cause shell commands to be run and load arbitrary code into the
> backend and write code in untrusted procedural languages and mutilate
> the system catalogs and lots of other terrible things.
I guess the question then is what security controls are appropriate for this feature, which after all tells the
postmasterwhat directories to read files from. It feels a little outside the scope of a regular user to even be aware
ofthe file system undergirding the service. But perhaps there’s a non-superuser role for whom it is appropriate?
> Now, I think there are environments where people have used things like
> containers to try to lock down the superuser, and while I'm not sure
> that can ever be particularly water-tight, if it were the case that
> this patch would make it a whole lot easier for a superuser to bypass
> the kinds of controls that people are imposing today, that might be an
> argument against this patch. But ... off-hand, I'm not seeing such an
> exposure.
Yeah I’m not even sure I follow. Containers are immutable, other than mutable mounted volumes --- which is one use case
thispatch is attempting to enable.
> On the patch itself, I find the documentation for this to be fairly
> hard to understand. I think it could benefit from an example. I'm
> confused about whether this is intended to let me search for
> extensions in /my/temp/root/usr/lib/postgresql/... by setting
> extension_directory=/my/temp/dir, or whether it's intended me to
> search both /usr/lib/postgresql as I normally would and also
> /some/other/place.
I sketched them quickly, so agree they can be better. Reading the code, I now see that it appears to be the former
case.I’d like to advocate for the latter.
> If the latter, I wonder why we don't handle shared
> libraries by setting dynamic_library_path and then just have an
> analogue of that for control files.
The challenge is that it applies not just to shared object libraries and control files, but also extension SQL files
andany other SHAREDIR files an extension might include. But also, I think it should support all the pg_config
installationtargets that extensions might use, including:
BINDIR
DOCDIR
HTMLDIR
PKGINCLUDEDIR
LOCALEDIR
MANDIR
I can imagine an extension wanting or needing to use any and all of these.
Best,
David