Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)

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От Joe Conway
Тема Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
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Msg-id efb15d91-5176-3f7d-bfe1-049596337ec9@joeconway.com
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Ответ на Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)  (Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>)
Ответы Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)  (Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>)
Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)  (Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>)
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On 6/13/19 11:07 AM, Bruce Momjian wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 04:26:47PM +0900, Masahiko Sawada wrote:
>> Yeah, in principle since data key of 2 tier key architecture should
>> not go outside database I think we should not tell data keys to
>> utility commands. So the rearranging WAL format seems to be a better
>> solution but is there any reason why the main data is placed at end of
>> WAL record? I wonder if we can assemble WAL records as following order
>> and encrypt only 3 and 4.
>>
>> 1. Header data (XLogRecord and other headers)
>> 2. Main data (xl_heap_insert, xl_heap_update etc + related data)
>> 3. Block data (Tuple data, FPI)
>> 4. Sub data (e.g tuple data for logical decoding)
>
> Yes, that does sound like a reasonable idea.  It is similar to us not
> encrypting the clog --- there is little value.  However, if we only
> encrypt the cluster, we don't need to expose the relfilenode and we can
> just encrypt the entire WAL --- I like that simplicity.  We might find
> that the complexity of encrypting only certain tablespaces makes the
> system slower than just encrypting the entire cluster.


There are reasons other than performance to want more granular than
entire cluster encryption. Limiting the volume of encrypted data with
any one key for example. And not encrypting #1 & 2 above would help
avoid known-plaintext attacks I would think.


>> > > Also, for system catalog encryption, it could be a hard part. System
>> > > catalogs are initially created at initdb time and created by copying
>> > > from template1 when CREATE DATABASE. Therefore we would need to either
>> > > modify initdb so that it's aware of encryption keys and KMS or modify
>> > > database creation so that it copies database file while encrypting
>> > > them.
>> >
>> > I assume initdb will use the same API that you would use to start the
>> > server itself, e.g., type in a password, or contact a key server.
>>
>> I realized that in XTS encryption mode since we craft the tweak using
>> relfilenode we will need to have the different tweaks for system
>> catalogs in new database would change. So we might need to re-encrypt
>> system catalogs when CREATE DATABASE after all. I suspect that even
>> the cluster-wide encryption has the same problem.
>
> Yes, this is why I want to just do cluster-wide encryption at this
> stage.
>
> In addition, while the 8k blocks would use a block cipher, the WAL would
> likely use a stream cipher, and it will be very hard to use multiple
> stream ciphers in a single WAL file.


I don't understand why we would not just use AES for both.

Joe

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