Re: Support getrandom() for pg_strong_random() source
От | Peter Eisentraut |
---|---|
Тема | Re: Support getrandom() for pg_strong_random() source |
Дата | |
Msg-id | e7f45075-4078-4d5c-923e-9cd8c3703050@eisentraut.org обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Support getrandom() for pg_strong_random() source (Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>) |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 30.07.25 13:55, Daniel Gustafsson wrote: >> The point still stands that the number of installations without OpenSSL support is approximately zero, so what is thepurpose of this patch if approximately no one will be able to use it? > The main usecase I've heard discussed (mostly in hallway tracks IIRC) is to > allow multiple PRNG's so that codepaths which favor performance over > cryptographic properties can choose, this would not be that but a small step on > that path (whether or not that's the appropriate step is debatable). This sounds like a reasonable goal. Intuitively, you want stronger randomness for hashing a password than for generating UUIDs. Then again, it's not clear how much stronger exactly. RFC 9562 does call for "cryptographically secure" random numbers. Do we want multiple levels of "strong" or "secure"? This needs a lot more analysis.
В списке pgsql-hackers по дате отправления: