Re: initdb recommendations

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От Joe Conway
Тема Re: initdb recommendations
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Msg-id df011ad3-f1a3-149e-3489-2d68e6ea21a7@joeconway.com
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Ответ на Re: initdb recommendations  (Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>)
Ответы Re: initdb recommendations  (Dave Cramer <pg@fastcrypt.com>)
Re: initdb recommendations  (Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com>)
Re: initdb recommendations  (Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>)
Список pgsql-hackers
On 5/23/19 10:30 PM, Stephen Frost wrote:
> Greetings,
> 
> * Tom Lane (tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us) wrote:
>> "Jonathan S. Katz" <jkatz@postgresql.org> writes:
>> > For now I have left in the password based method to be scram-sha-256 as
>> > I am optimistic about the support across client drivers[1] (and FWIW I
>> > have an implementation for crystal-pg ~60% done).
>> 
>> > However, this probably means we would need to set the default password
>> > encryption guc to "scram-sha-256" which we're not ready to do yet, so it
>> > may be moot to leave it in.
>> 
>> > So, thinking out loud about that, we should probably use "md5" and once
>> > we decide to make the encryption method "scram-sha-256" by default, then
>> > we update the recommendation?
>> 
>> Meh.  If we're going to break things, let's break them.  Set it to
>> scram by default and let people who need to cope with old clients
>> change the default.  I'm tired of explaining that MD5 isn't actually
>> insecure in our usage ...
> 
> +many.

many++

Are we doing this for pg12? In any case, I would think we better loudly
point out this change somewhere.

Joe

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