Re: system administration functions with hardcoded superuser checks
| От | Simon Riggs | 
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: system administration functions with hardcoded superuser checks | 
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | CA+U5nML8aseG+=KH34Xab+CFNEr8uL+TCBb2Gy6h0jPa6oOKLg@mail.gmail.com обсуждение исходный текст  | 
		
| Ответ на | Re: system administration functions with hardcoded superuser checks (Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>) | 
| Список | pgsql-hackers | 
On 19 December 2012 06:34, Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net> wrote: > Granting executability on pg_read_xyz is pretty darn close to granting > superuser, without explicitly asking for it. Well, you get "read only > superuser". If we want to make that step as easy as just GRANT, we > really need to write some *very* strong warnings in the documentation > so that people realize this. I doubt most people will realize it > unless we do that (and those who don't read the docs, whch is probably > a majority, never will). Good point. Can we do that explicitly with fine grained superuser-ness? GRANT SUPERUSER ON FUNCTION .... TO foo; > If you use SECURITY DEFINER, you can limit the functions to *the > specific files that you want to grant read on*. Which makes it > possible to actually make it secure. E.g. you *don't* have to give > full read to your entire database. Even better point > If you're comparing it to a blanket SECURITY DEFINER with no checks, > then yes, it's a simpler way to fire the cannon into your own foot, > yes. But if also gives you a way that makes it more likely that you > don't *realize* that you're about to fire a cannon into your foot. -- Simon Riggs http://www.2ndQuadrant.com/PostgreSQL Development, 24x7 Support, Training & Services
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