On Tue, Dec 18, 2012 at 7:41 PM, Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 18, 2012 at 12:09:10PM -0500, Peter Eisentraut wrote:
>> There are some system administration functions that have hardcoded
>> superuser checks, specifically:
>>
>> pg_reload_conf
>> pg_rotate_logfile
>> pg_read_file
>> pg_read_file_all
>> pg_read_binary_file
>> pg_read_binary_file_all
>> pg_stat_file
>> pg_ls_dir
>>
>> Some of these are useful in monitoring or maintenance tools, and the
>> hardcoded superuser checks require that these tools run with maximum
>> privileges. Couldn't we just install these functions without default
>> privileges and allow users to grant privileges as necessary?
>
> +1. You can already use a SECURITY DEFINER wrapper, so I don't think this
> opens any particular floodgate. GRANT is a nicer interface. However, I would
> not advertise this as a replacement for wrapper functions until pg_dump can
> preserve ACL changes to pg_catalog objects.
Yeah. That is a bit of a foot-gun to this approach, although I too
agree on the general theory.
--
Robert Haas
EnterpriseDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
The Enterprise PostgreSQL Company