Re: [PATCH] New predefined role pg_manage_extensions
От | Robert Haas |
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Тема | Re: [PATCH] New predefined role pg_manage_extensions |
Дата | |
Msg-id | CA+Tgmoa3OA+1T-SBDLkVqgYW1cFSjuSF=L_wh=CJM+k=P+8OAA@mail.gmail.com обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: [PATCH] New predefined role pg_manage_extensions (Jelte Fennema-Nio <postgres@jeltef.nl>) |
Ответы |
Re: [PATCH] New predefined role pg_manage_extensions
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Fri, Jan 12, 2024 at 10:13 AM Jelte Fennema-Nio <postgres@jeltef.nl> wrote: > On Fri, 12 Jan 2024 at 15:53, Michael Banck <mbanck@gmx.net> wrote: > > I propose to add a new predefined role to Postgres, > > pg_manage_extensions. The idea is that it allows Superusers to delegate > > the rights to create, update or delete extensions to other roles, even > > if those extensions are not trusted or those users are not the database > > owner. > > I agree that extension creation is one of the main reasons people > require superuser access, and I think it would be beneficial to try to > reduce that. But I'm not sure that such a pg_manage_extensions role > would have any fewer permissions than superuser in practice. Afaik > many extensions that are not marked as trusted, are not trusted > because they would allow fairly trivial privilege escalation to > superuser if they were. I see that Jelte walked this comment back, but I think this issue needs more discussion. I'm not intrinsically against having a role like pg_execute_server_programs that allows escalation to superuser, but I don't see how it would help a cloud provider whose goal is to NOT allow administrators to escalate to superuser. What am I missing? -- Robert Haas EDB: http://www.enterprisedb.com
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