John R Pierce wrote:
> On 2/12/2016 5:20 AM, Lesley Kimmel wrote:
>> Thanks for the reply Laurenz. Of course the first thing that I thought
>> of to prevent man-in-the-middle was SSL. However, I also like to try
>> to address the issue in a way that seems to get at what they are
>> intending. It seemed to me that they wanted to do some configuration
>> within the database related to session IDs.
>
> when the connection is broken, the process exits and the session ceases
> to exist. there are no 'session IDs' to speak of (they are process
> IDs instead, but a new process mandates new authentication, there's no
> residual authorizations associated with a PID).
I might be misunderstanding, but is there any connection to a
man-in-the-middle attack?
Without SSL, anybody who can tap into the TCP communication can inject
SQL statements. No session ID is required.
Yours,
Laurenz Albe