Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)
| От | Antonin Houska |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS) |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | 98597.1573502255@antos обсуждение исходный текст |
| Ответ на | Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS) (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>) |
| Список | pgsql-hackers |
Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> wrote: > On Sat, Nov 2, 2019 at 8:23 AM Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at> wrote: > > Change to hint bits does not result in LSN change in the case I described here > > > > https://www.postgresql.org/message-id/28452.1572443058%40antos > > > > but I consider this a bug (BTW, I discovered this problem when thinking about > > the use of LSN as encryption IV). Do you mean any other case? If LSN does not > > get changed, then the related full-page image WAL record is not guaranteed to > > be on disk during crash recovery. Thus if page checksum is invalid due to > > torn-page write, there's now WAL record to fix the page. > > I thought the idea was that the first change to hint bits after a > given checkpoint produced an FPI, but subsequent changes within the > same checkpoint cycle do not. Got it, this is what happens in XLogSaveBufferForHint(). Perhaps we can fix it by issuing XLOG_NOOP record in the cases that produce no FPI. Of course only if the encryption is enabled. -- Antonin Houska Web: https://www.cybertec-postgresql.com
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