Re: Authentication fails for md5 connections if ~/.postgresql/postgresql.{crt and key} exist
От | Jim Jones |
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Тема | Re: Authentication fails for md5 connections if ~/.postgresql/postgresql.{crt and key} exist |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 960f89e0-bc63-8a22-5f3d-a977228c1264@uni-muenster.de обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Authentication fails for md5 connections if ~/.postgresql/postgresql.{crt and key} exist (Cary Huang <cary.huang@highgo.ca>) |
Ответы |
Re: Authentication fails for md5 connections if ~/.postgresql/postgresql.{crt and key} exist
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 27.01.23 21:13, Cary Huang wrote: > I agree that it is a more elegant approach to add > "sslcertmode=disable" on the client side to prevent sending default > certificate. > > But, if the server does request clientcert but client uses > "sslcertmode=disable" to connect and not give a certificate, it would > also result in authentication failure. In this case, we actually would > want to ignore "sslcertmode=disable" and send default certificates if > found. Those are all very good points. > But, if the server does request clientcert but client uses "sslcertmode=disable" to connect and not give a certificate, it would also result in authentication failure. In this case, we actually would want to ignore "sslcertmode=disable" and send default certificates if found. I'm just wondering if this is really necessary. If the server asks for a certificate and the user explicitly says "I don't want to send it", shouldn't it be ok for the server return an authentication failure? I mean, wouldn't it defeat the purpose of "sslcertmode=disable"? Although it might be indeed quite handy I'm not sure how I feel about explicitly telling the client to not send a certificate and having it being sent anyway :) Best, Jim
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