Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)

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От Antonin Houska
Тема Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)
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Msg-id 9148.1552063139@localhost
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Ответ на Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and Key Management Service (KMS)  (Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at>)
Ответы Re: [Proposal] Table-level Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) and KeyManagement Service (KMS)
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Antonin Houska <ah@cybertec.at> wrote:

> Masahiko Sawada <sawada.mshk@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Agreed.
> >
> > For the WAL encryption, I wonder if we can have a encryption key
> > dedicated for WAL. Regardless of keys of tables and indexes all WAL
> > are encrypted with the WAL key. During the recovery the startup
> > process decrypts WAL and applies it, and then the table data will be
> > encrypted with its table key when flushing. So we just control the
> > scope of encryption object: WAL of tables and indexes etc or
> > everything.
>
> My point of view is that different key usually means different user. The user
> who can decrypt WAL can effectively see all the data, even though another user
> put them (encrypted with another key) into tables. So in this case, different
> keys don't really separate users in terms of data access.

Please ignore what I said here. You probably meant that the WAL is both
encrypted and decrypted using the same (dedicated) key.

--
Antonin Houska
https://www.cybertec-postgresql.com


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