Re: RFC 9266: Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3 support
| От | Heikki Linnakangas |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: RFC 9266: Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3 support |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | 64020c29-9da7-4a4d-b61b-53c1a3fdff49@iki.fi обсуждение исходный текст |
| Ответ на | RFC 9266: Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3 support (* Neustradamus * <neustradamus@hotmail.com>) |
| Ответы |
Re: RFC 9266: Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3 support
Re: RFC 9266: Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3 support Re: RFC 9266: Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3 support |
| Список | pgsql-hackers |
On 20/11/2025 22:58, * Neustradamus * wrote: > Dear PostgreSQL team, dear all, > > In 2022, I have contacted PostgreSQL team about Channel Binding: > - https://www.postgresql.org/search/?m=1&q=tls-exporter&l=&d=-1&s=i > > We are in 2025, I relaunch the subject because several developers always say me: "it is not supported by PostgreSQL". > > Can you add the support of RFC 9266: Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3? > - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9266 I think that would be great. Patches are welcome! The tricky part is probably going to be to make the protocol changes in a way that is both backwards-compatible and as secure as possible. But I'm sure it can be done. > Channel Bindings for TLS: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5929 > > - XEP-0388: Extensible SASL Profile: https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0388.html > - XEP-0440: SASL Channel-Binding Type Capability: https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0440.html > - XEP-0474: SASL SCRAM Downgrade Protection: https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0474.html > - XEP-0480: SASL Upgrade Tasks: https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0480.html > > Little details, to know easily: > - tls-unique for TLS =< 1.2 (RFC5929) > - tls-server-end-point =< 1.2 + 1.3 (RFC5929) > - tls-exporter for TLS = 1.3 (RFC9266) > > After the jabber.ru MITM, it is time to add it: > - https://notes.valdikss.org.ru/jabber.ru-mitm/ > - https://snikket.org/blog/on-the-jabber-ru-mitm/ > - https://www.devever.net/~hl/xmpp-incident > - https://blog.jmp.chat/b/certwatch/certwatch PostgreSQL does support channel binding, with tls-server-end-point. I believe that sufficient to prevent an attack like that. (Assuming that it's configured correctly, but that's an issue of insecure defaults rather than a missing feature). What are the benefits of tls-exporter over tls-server-end-point? I agree it would be good to support tls-exporter, since RFC9266 specifies it as mandatory for channel binding over TLS 1.3. But aside from the RFC, is there some practical difference? - Heikki
В списке pgsql-hackers по дате отправления: