Re: [PATCH] unalias of ACL_SELECT_FOR_UPDATE
| От | Tom Lane |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: [PATCH] unalias of ACL_SELECT_FOR_UPDATE |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | 6167.1240239593@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
| Ответ на | Re: [PATCH] unalias of ACL_SELECT_FOR_UPDATE (Greg Stark <stark@enterprisedb.com>) |
| Ответы |
Re: [PATCH] unalias of ACL_SELECT_FOR_UPDATE
|
| Список | pgsql-hackers |
Greg Stark <stark@enterprisedb.com> writes:
> I think we're talking at cross purposes here. I think Kai Gai's
> descriptions make sense if you start with a different set of
> assumptions. The idea behind SELinux is that each individual object is
> access controlled and each user has credentials which grant access to
> specific operations on specific objects. As I understand it part of
> the goal is to eliminate situations where "setuid" or other forms of
> privilege escalation is required.
Well, if so, the idea is a miserable failure. SELinux has just as many
setuid programs as any other Unix, and absolutely zero hope of removing
them. I am not going to take the idea of "remove setuid" seriously when
they haven't been able to accomplish it anywhere else.
regards, tom lane
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