Peter Eisentraut <peter.eisentraut@2ndquadrant.com> writes:
> On 8/11/16 9:12 PM, Michael Paquier wrote:
>> Note that pg_dump[all] and pg_upgrade already have safeguards against
>> those things per the same routines putting quotes for execution as
>> commands into psql and shell. So attached is a patch to implement this
>> restriction in the backend, and I am adding that to the next CF for
>> 10.0. Attached is as well a script able to trigger those errors.
> After further review, I have my doubts about this approach.
> Everything that is using appendShellString() is now going to reject LF
> and CR characters, but there is no systematic way by which this is
> managed, enforced, or documented. It happens that right now most of the
> affected cases are user and database names, but there are others. For
> example, you cannot anymore install PostgreSQL into a path containing
> LF/CR, because initdb will fail when it composes the pg_ctl command line
> to print out. Also, initdb will fail if the data directory name
> contains LF/CR, but it creates the directory nonetheless. (Apparently,
> it doesn't even clean it up.) But for example pg_ctl and pg_basebackup
> and postgres itself handle all of that just fine. This is a slowly
> growing mess.
> I think the way forward here, if any, is to work on removing these
> restrictions, not to keep sprinkling them around.
I think probably a better answer is to reject bad paths earlier, eg have
initdb error out before doing anything if the proposed -D path contains
CR/LF. Given the collection of security bugs we just fixed, and the
strong likelihood that user-written scripts contain other instances of
the same type of problem, I do not think we are doing anybody any favors
if we sweat bullets to support such paths. And I'm not even convinced
that we *can* support such paths on Windows; no one was able to find a
safe shell quoting solution there.
And yeah, the docs probably need work.
regards, tom lane