Re: patch: Client certificate requirements

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От Magnus Hagander
Тема Re: patch: Client certificate requirements
Дата
Msg-id 492141B7.70906@hagander.net
обсуждение исходный текст
Ответ на Re: patch: Client certificate requirements  ("Alex Hunsaker" <badalex@gmail.com>)
Ответы Re: patch: Client certificate requirements  ("Alex Hunsaker" <badalex@gmail.com>)
Список pgsql-hackers
Alex Hunsaker wrote:
> On Sat, Nov 15, 2008 at 17:39, Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
>> "Alex Hunsaker" <badalex@gmail.com> writes:
>>> Err that really should be ereport(FATAL,
>> I don't think that's a particularly user-friendly design.
>>
>> The behavior I'd expect to see is
>>
>> 1. Root cert file not there: issue existing LOG message.  Maybe the user is
>> expecting client cert verification, and maybe he isn't, but it is a good
>> idea to put out the LOG message just to make sure he knows what will
>> happen.
>
> Right, pre patch I agree with you.  The problem I noticed with the
> patch is we say nothing if its there and you can't read it.  The whole
> point of the patch is to give you the option of forcing client certs.
> So why LOG every server start up just because I turned on ssl.  If
> pg_hba is setup right you'll get the appropriate error message when
> the client connects.

Yeah, I agree with Alex on this. It makes sense not to log it in that case.

If it's there and we fail, we must log the details, but if it's just not
there, it can be logged at a later stage.

>> 2. Root cert file present but we fail to load it: FATAL is probably okay
>> here, but not with that hint message.
>
> Err, I was just trying to be congruent with HEAD.  Currently that's
> the message you get if we could not "read" the root cert.  (as a LOG,
> not FATAL). Should just drop the hint and keep the FATAL for this
> case?

Yes, I think so.

New version of the patch attached.


> Also we check that the private key is at least 0600, should we be
> doing the same for the root cert?

No need. The certificate is public information. The first thing we do on
an SSL connection is to send the thing to the client anyway.

We *could* check that it's not writable by anybody else - but do we
check that for our datafiles which contain the actual passwords and
such? If not, that would just be strange to do here, really..

//Magnus
*** a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
--- b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
***************
*** 1646,1658 **** $ <userinput>kill -INT `head -1 /usr/local/pgsql/data/postmaster.pid`</userinput
     been entered.
    </para>

!   <para>
     To require the client to supply a trusted certificate, place
     certificates of the certificate authorities (<acronym>CA</acronym>)
     you trust in the file <filename>root.crt</filename> in the data
!    directory.  A certificate will then be requested from the client during
     SSL connection startup.  (See <xref linkend="libpq-ssl"> for a
!    description of how to set up client certificates.)  The server will
     verify that the client's certificate is signed by one of the trusted
     certificate authorities.  Certificate Revocation List (CRL) entries
     are also checked if the file <filename>root.crl</filename> exists.
--- 1646,1662 ----
     been entered.
    </para>

!   <sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
!    <title>Using client certificates</title>
!    <para>
     To require the client to supply a trusted certificate, place
     certificates of the certificate authorities (<acronym>CA</acronym>)
     you trust in the file <filename>root.crt</filename> in the data
!    directory, and set the <literal>clientcert</literal> parameter
!    to <literal>1</literal> on the appropriate line(s) in pg_hba.conf.
!    A certificate will then be requested from the client during
     SSL connection startup.  (See <xref linkend="libpq-ssl"> for a
!    description of how to set up certificates on the client.)  The server will
     verify that the client's certificate is signed by one of the trusted
     certificate authorities.  Certificate Revocation List (CRL) entries
     are also checked if the file <filename>root.crl</filename> exists.
***************
*** 1663,1673 **** $ <userinput>kill -INT `head -1 /usr/local/pgsql/data/postmaster.pid`</userinput
    </para>

    <para>
!    If the <filename>root.crt</filename> file is not present, client
!    certificates will not be requested or checked.  In this mode, SSL
!    provides encrypted communication but not authentication.
    </para>

    <para>
     The files <filename>server.key</>, <filename>server.crt</>,
     <filename>root.crt</filename>, and <filename>root.crl</filename>
--- 1667,1689 ----
    </para>

    <para>
!    The <literal>clientcert</literal> option in <filename>pg_hba.conf</>
!    is available for all authentication methods, but only for rows
!    specified as <literal>hostssl</>. Unless specified, the default is
!    not to verify the client certificate.
!   </para>
!
!   <para>
!    <productname>PostgreSQL</> currently does not support authentication
!    using client certificates, since it cannot differentiate between
!    different users. As long as the user holds any certificate issued
!    by a trusted CA it will be accepted, regardless of what account the
!    user is trying to connect with.
    </para>
+   </sect2>

+   <sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
+    <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
    <para>
     The files <filename>server.key</>, <filename>server.crt</>,
     <filename>root.crt</filename>, and <filename>root.crl</filename>
***************
*** 1704,1710 **** $ <userinput>kill -INT `head -1 /usr/local/pgsql/data/postmaster.pid`</userinput
       <row>
        <entry><filename>root.crt</></entry>
        <entry>trusted certificate authorities</entry>
!       <entry>requests client certificate; checks certificate is
        signed by a trusted certificate authority</entry>
       </row>

--- 1720,1726 ----
       <row>
        <entry><filename>root.crt</></entry>
        <entry>trusted certificate authorities</entry>
!       <entry>checks that client certificate is
        signed by a trusted certificate authority</entry>
       </row>

***************
*** 1717,1722 **** $ <userinput>kill -INT `head -1 /usr/local/pgsql/data/postmaster.pid`</userinput
--- 1733,1739 ----
      </tbody>
     </tgroup>
    </table>
+   </sect2>

    <sect2 id="ssl-certificate-creation">
     <title>Creating a Self-Signed Certificate</title>
*** a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
--- b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
***************
*** 272,277 **** ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
--- 272,311 ----
                   errmsg("missing or erroneous pg_hba.conf file"),
                   errhint("See server log for details.")));

+     /*
+      * This is the first point where we have access to the hba record for
+      * the current connection, so perform any verifications based on the
+      * hba options field that should be done *before* the authentication
+      * here.
+      */
+     if (port->hba->clientcert)
+     {
+         /*
+          * When we parse pg_hba.conf, we have already made sure that we have
+          * been able to load a certificate store. Thus, if a certificate is
+          * present on the client, it has been verified against our root
+          * certificate store, and the connection would have been aborted
+          * already if it didn't verify ok.
+          */
+ #ifdef USE_SSL
+         if (!port->peer)
+         {
+             ereport(FATAL,
+                     (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
+                      errmsg("connection requires a valid client certificate")));
+         }
+ #else
+         /*
+          * hba.c makes sure hba->clientcert can't be set unless OpenSSL
+          * is present.
+          */
+         Assert(false);
+ #endif
+     }
+
+     /*
+      * Now proceed to do the actual authentication check
+      */
      switch (port->hba->auth_method)
      {
          case uaReject:
*** a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
--- b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
***************
*** 102,107 **** static const char *SSLerrmessage(void);
--- 102,108 ----
  #define RENEGOTIATION_LIMIT (512 * 1024 * 1024)

  static SSL_CTX *SSL_context = NULL;
+ static bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;

  /* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
  char       *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
***************
*** 203,208 **** secure_destroy(void)
--- 204,222 ----
  }

  /*
+  * Indicate if we have loaded the root CA store to verify certificates
+  */
+ bool
+ secure_loaded_verify_locations(void)
+ {
+ #ifdef USE_SSL
+     return ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
+ #endif
+
+     return false;
+ }
+
+ /*
   *    Attempt to negotiate secure session.
   */
  int
***************
*** 754,768 **** initialize_SSL(void)
          elog(FATAL, "could not set the cipher list (no valid ciphers available)");

      /*
!      * Require and check client certificates only if we have a root.crt file.
       */
!     if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_context, ROOT_CERT_FILE, NULL))
      {
!         /* Not fatal - we do not require client certificates */
!         ereport(LOG,
                  (errmsg("could not load root certificate file \"%s\": %s",
!                         ROOT_CERT_FILE, SSLerrmessage()),
!                  errdetail("Will not verify client certificates.")));
      }
      else
      {
--- 768,801 ----
          elog(FATAL, "could not set the cipher list (no valid ciphers available)");

      /*
!      * Attempt to load CA store, so we can verify client certificates if needed.
       */
!     if (access(ROOT_CERT_FILE, R_OK))
      {
!         ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
!
!         /*
!          * If root certificate file simply not found. Don't log an error here, because
!          * it's quite likely the user isn't planning on using client certificates.
!          * If we can't access it for other reasons, it is an error.
!          */
!         if (errno != ENOENT)
!         {
!             ereport(FATAL,
!                     (errmsg("could not access root certificate file \"%s\": %m",
!                             ROOT_CERT_FILE)));
!         }
!     }
!     else if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_context, ROOT_CERT_FILE, NULL))
!     {
!         /*
!          * File was there, but we could not load it. This means the file is somehow
!          * broken, and we cannot do verification at all - so abort here.
!          */
!         ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
!         ereport(FATAL,
                  (errmsg("could not load root certificate file \"%s\": %s",
!                         ROOT_CERT_FILE, SSLerrmessage())));
      }
      else
      {
***************
*** 795,807 **** initialize_SSL(void)
                                  ROOT_CRL_FILE, SSLerrmessage()),
                           errdetail("Certificates will not be checked against revocation list.")));
              }
-         }

!         SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_context,
!                            (SSL_VERIFY_PEER |
!                             SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT |
!                             SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE),
!                            verify_cb);
      }
  }

--- 828,845 ----
                                  ROOT_CRL_FILE, SSLerrmessage()),
                           errdetail("Certificates will not be checked against revocation list.")));
              }

!             /*
!              * Always ask for SSL client cert, but don't fail if it's not presented. We'll fail later in this case,
!              * based on what we find in pg_hba.conf.
!              */
!             SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_context,
!                                (SSL_VERIFY_PEER |
!                                 SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE),
!                                verify_cb);
!
!             ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
!         }
      }
  }

*** a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
--- b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
***************
*** 927,932 **** parse_hba_line(List *line, int line_num, HbaLine *parsedline)
--- 927,964 ----
                      INVALID_AUTH_OPTION("map", "ident, krb5, gssapi and sspi");
                  parsedline->usermap = pstrdup(c);
              }
+             else if (strcmp(token, "clientcert") == 0)
+             {
+                 /*
+                  * Since we require ctHostSSL, this really can never happen on non-SSL-enabled
+                  * builds, so don't bother checking for USE_SSL.
+                  */
+                 if (parsedline->conntype != ctHostSSL)
+                 {
+                     ereport(LOG,
+                             (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+                              errmsg("clientcert can only be configured for \"hostssl\" rows"),
+                              errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+                                         line_num, HbaFileName)));
+                     return false;
+                 }
+                 if (strcmp(c, "1") == 0)
+                 {
+                     if (!secure_loaded_verify_locations())
+                     {
+                         ereport(LOG,
+                                 (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+                                  errmsg("client certificates can only be checked if a root certificate store is
available"),
+                                  errdetail("make sure the root certificate store is present and readable"),
+                                  errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+                                             line_num, HbaFileName)));
+                         return false;
+                     }
+                     parsedline->clientcert = true;
+                 }
+                 else
+                     parsedline->clientcert = false;
+             }
              else if (strcmp(token, "pamservice") == 0)
              {
                  REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaPAM, "pamservice", "pam");
*** a/src/include/libpq/hba.h
--- b/src/include/libpq/hba.h
***************
*** 54,59 **** typedef struct
--- 54,60 ----
      int            ldapport;
      char       *ldapprefix;
      char       *ldapsuffix;
+     bool        clientcert;
  } HbaLine;

  typedef struct Port hbaPort;
*** a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
--- b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
***************
*** 67,72 **** extern void pq_endcopyout(bool errorAbort);
--- 67,73 ----
   * prototypes for functions in be-secure.c
   */
  extern int    secure_initialize(void);
+ extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
  extern void secure_destroy(void);
  extern int    secure_open_server(Port *port);
  extern void secure_close(Port *port);

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