Re: patch: Client certificate requirements

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От Magnus Hagander
Тема Re: patch: Client certificate requirements
Дата
Msg-id 49009D67.4040202@hagander.net
обсуждение исходный текст
Ответ на patch: Client certificate requirements  (Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>)
Ответы Re: patch: Client certificate requirements  ("Alex Hunsaker" <badalex@gmail.com>)
Список pgsql-hackers
Magnus Hagander wrote:
> This patch adds a configuration option to pg_hba.conf for "clientcert".
> This makes it possible to have different client certificate requirements
> on different connections. It also makes sure that if you specify that
> you want client cert verification and the root store isn't there, we
> give an error instead of silently allowing the user in (like we do now).
>
> This still does not implement actual client certificate validation -
> that's for a later step. It just cleans up the handling we have now.

Uh, with docs.

//Magnus

*** a/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
--- b/doc/src/sgml/runtime.sgml
***************
*** 1646,1658 **** $ <userinput>kill -INT `head -1 /usr/local/pgsql/data/postmaster.pid`</userinput
     been entered.
    </para>

!   <para>
     To require the client to supply a trusted certificate, place
     certificates of the certificate authorities (<acronym>CA</acronym>)
     you trust in the file <filename>root.crt</filename> in the data
!    directory.  A certificate will then be requested from the client during
     SSL connection startup.  (See <xref linkend="libpq-ssl"> for a
!    description of how to set up client certificates.)  The server will
     verify that the client's certificate is signed by one of the trusted
     certificate authorities.  Certificate Revocation List (CRL) entries
     are also checked if the file <filename>root.crl</filename> exists.
--- 1646,1662 ----
     been entered.
    </para>

!   <sect2 id="ssl-client-certificates">
!    <title>Using client certificates</title>
!    <para>
     To require the client to supply a trusted certificate, place
     certificates of the certificate authorities (<acronym>CA</acronym>)
     you trust in the file <filename>root.crt</filename> in the data
!    directory, and set the <literal>clientcert</literal> parameter
!    to <literal>1</literal> on the appropriate line(s) in pg_hba.conf.
!    A certificate will then be requested from the client during
     SSL connection startup.  (See <xref linkend="libpq-ssl"> for a
!    description of how to set up certificates on the client.)  The server will
     verify that the client's certificate is signed by one of the trusted
     certificate authorities.  Certificate Revocation List (CRL) entries
     are also checked if the file <filename>root.crl</filename> exists.
***************
*** 1663,1673 **** $ <userinput>kill -INT `head -1 /usr/local/pgsql/data/postmaster.pid`</userinput
    </para>

    <para>
!    If the <filename>root.crt</filename> file is not present, client
!    certificates will not be requested or checked.  In this mode, SSL
!    provides encrypted communication but not authentication.
    </para>

    <para>
     The files <filename>server.key</>, <filename>server.crt</>,
     <filename>root.crt</filename>, and <filename>root.crl</filename>
--- 1667,1689 ----
    </para>

    <para>
!    The <literal>clientcert</literal> option in <filename>pg_hba.conf</>
!    is available for all authentication methods, but only for rows
!    specified as <literal>hostssl</>. Unless specified, the default is
!    not to verify the client certificate.
!   </para>
!
!   <para>
!    <productname>PostgreSQL</> currently does not support authentication
!    using client certificates, since it cannot differentiate between
!    different users. As long as the user holds any certificate issued
!    by a trusted CA it will be accepted, regardless of what account the
!    user is trying to connect with.
    </para>
+   </sect2>

+   <sect2 id="ssl-server-files">
+    <title>SSL Server File Usage</title>
    <para>
     The files <filename>server.key</>, <filename>server.crt</>,
     <filename>root.crt</filename>, and <filename>root.crl</filename>
***************
*** 1704,1710 **** $ <userinput>kill -INT `head -1 /usr/local/pgsql/data/postmaster.pid`</userinput
       <row>
        <entry><filename>root.crt</></entry>
        <entry>trusted certificate authorities</entry>
!       <entry>requests client certificate; checks certificate is
        signed by a trusted certificate authority</entry>
       </row>

--- 1720,1726 ----
       <row>
        <entry><filename>root.crt</></entry>
        <entry>trusted certificate authorities</entry>
!       <entry>checks that client certificate is
        signed by a trusted certificate authority</entry>
       </row>

***************
*** 1717,1722 **** $ <userinput>kill -INT `head -1 /usr/local/pgsql/data/postmaster.pid`</userinput
--- 1733,1739 ----
      </tbody>
     </tgroup>
    </table>
+   </sect2>

    <sect2 id="ssl-certificate-creation">
     <title>Creating a Self-Signed Certificate</title>
*** a/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
--- b/src/backend/libpq/auth.c
***************
*** 273,278 **** ClientAuthentication(Port *port)
--- 273,304 ----
                   errmsg("missing or erroneous pg_hba.conf file"),
                   errhint("See server log for details.")));

+     /*
+      * This is the first point where we have access to the hba record for
+      * the current connection, so perform any verifications based on the
+      * hba options field that should be done *before* the authentication
+      * here.
+      */
+     if (port->hba->clientcert)
+     {
+         /*
+          * When we parse pg_hba.conf, we have already made sure that we have
+          * been able to load a certificate store. Thus, if a certificate is
+          * present on the client, it has been verified against our root
+          * certificate store, and the connection would have been aborted
+          * already if it didn't verify ok.
+          */
+         if (!port->peer)
+         {
+             ereport(FATAL,
+                     (errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
+                      errmsg("connection requires a valid client certificate")));
+         }
+     }
+
+     /*
+      * Now proceed to do the actual authentication check
+      */
      switch (port->hba->auth_method)
      {
          case uaReject:
*** a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
--- b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
***************
*** 128,133 **** static const char *SSLerrmessage(void);
--- 128,134 ----
  #define RENEGOTIATION_LIMIT (512 * 1024 * 1024)

  static SSL_CTX *SSL_context = NULL;
+ static bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;

  /* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
  char       *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
***************
*** 229,234 **** secure_destroy(void)
--- 230,248 ----
  }

  /*
+  * Indicate if we have loaded the root CA store to verify certificates
+  */
+ bool
+ secure_loaded_verify_locations(void)
+ {
+ #ifdef USE_SSL
+     return ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
+ #endif
+
+     return false;
+ }
+
+ /*
   *    Attempt to negotiate secure session.
   */
  int
***************
*** 780,794 **** initialize_SSL(void)
          elog(FATAL, "could not set the cipher list (no valid ciphers available)");

      /*
!      * Require and check client certificates only if we have a root.crt file.
       */
!     if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_context, ROOT_CERT_FILE, NULL))
      {
!         /* Not fatal - we do not require client certificates */
          ereport(LOG,
                  (errmsg("could not load root certificate file \"%s\": %s",
                          ROOT_CERT_FILE, SSLerrmessage()),
!                  errdetail("Will not verify client certificates.")));
      }
      else
      {
--- 794,821 ----
          elog(FATAL, "could not set the cipher list (no valid ciphers available)");

      /*
!      * Attempt to load CA store, so we can verify client certificates if needed.
       */
!     if (access(ROOT_CERT_FILE, R_OK))
      {
!         /*
!          * Root certificate file simply not found. Don't log an error here, because
!          * it's quite likely the user isn't planning on using client certificates.
!          */
!         ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
!     }
!     else if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_context, ROOT_CERT_FILE, NULL))
!     {
!         /*
!          * File was there, but we could not load it. This means the file is somehow
!          * broken, and we should log this. Don't log it as a fatal error, because
!          * there is still a chance that the user isn't going to use client certs.
!          */
!         ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
          ereport(LOG,
                  (errmsg("could not load root certificate file \"%s\": %s",
                          ROOT_CERT_FILE, SSLerrmessage()),
!                  errdetail("Will not be able to verify client certificates.")));
      }
      else
      {
***************
*** 821,833 **** initialize_SSL(void)
                                  ROOT_CRL_FILE, SSLerrmessage()),
                           errdetail("Certificates will not be checked against revocation list.")));
              }
-         }

!         SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_context,
!                            (SSL_VERIFY_PEER |
!                             SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT |
!                             SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE),
!                            verify_cb);
      }
  }

--- 848,865 ----
                                  ROOT_CRL_FILE, SSLerrmessage()),
                           errdetail("Certificates will not be checked against revocation list.")));
              }

!             /*
!              * Always ask for SSL client cert, but don't fail if it's not presented. We'll fail later in this case,
!              * based on what we find in pg_hba.conf.
!              */
!             SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_context,
!                                (SSL_VERIFY_PEER |
!                                 SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE),
!                                verify_cb);
!
!             ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
!         }
      }
  }

*** a/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
--- b/src/backend/libpq/hba.c
***************
*** 873,878 **** parse_hba_line(List *line, int line_num, HbaLine *parsedline)
--- 873,910 ----
                      INVALID_AUTH_OPTION("map", "ident, krb5, gssapi and sspi");
                  parsedline->usermap = pstrdup(c);
              }
+             else if (strcmp(token, "clientcert") == 0)
+             {
+                 /*
+                  * Since we require ctHostSSL, this really can never happen on non-SSL-enabled
+                  * builds, so don't bother checking for USE_SSL.
+                  */
+                 if (parsedline->conntype != ctHostSSL)
+                 {
+                     ereport(LOG,
+                             (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+                              errmsg("clientcert can only be configured for \"hostssl\" rows"),
+                              errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+                                         line_num, HbaFileName)));
+                     goto hba_other_error;
+                 }
+                 if (strcmp(c, "1") == 0)
+                 {
+                     if (!secure_loaded_verify_locations())
+                     {
+                         ereport(LOG,
+                                 (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+                                  errmsg("client certificates can only be checked if a root certificate store is
available"),
+                                  errdetail("make sure the root certificate store is present and readable"),
+                                  errcontext("line %d of configuration file \"%s\"",
+                                             line_num, HbaFileName)));
+                         goto hba_other_error;
+                     }
+                     parsedline->clientcert = true;
+                 }
+                 else
+                     parsedline->clientcert = false;
+             }
              else if (strcmp(token, "pamservice") == 0)
              {
                  REQUIRE_AUTH_OPTION(uaPAM, "pamservice", "pam");
*** a/src/include/libpq/hba.h
--- b/src/include/libpq/hba.h
***************
*** 55,60 **** typedef struct
--- 55,61 ----
      int            ldapport;
      char       *ldapprefix;
      char       *ldapsuffix;
+     bool        clientcert;
  } HbaLine;

  typedef struct Port hbaPort;
*** a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
--- b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
***************
*** 67,72 **** extern void pq_endcopyout(bool errorAbort);
--- 67,73 ----
   * prototypes for functions in be-secure.c
   */
  extern int    secure_initialize(void);
+ extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
  extern void secure_destroy(void);
  extern int    secure_open_server(Port *port);
  extern void secure_close(Port *port);

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