Re: [PATCH] pg_autovacuum commandline password hiding.

Tom Lane wrote:
> Neil Conway <neilc@samurai.com> writes:
>>I don't know which platforms it is secure/insecure on, but I can
>>certainly imagine secure systems where ps(1) data in general is viewed
>>as sensitive and thus not made globally visible.
>
>
> It's imaginable, but can you point to any real examples?

FreeBSD's MAC (security.mac.seeotheruids.enabled sysctl) and the
Openwall Linux kernel patch are the first examples I found, but I didn't
spend long searching.

>>I don't think there is sufficient justification for removing this
>>feature and breaking users of a stable release series.
>
> "Breaking" obviously-insecure usages is exactly the intention.

But it's not "obviously-insecure". In some situations it is perfectly
secure (or security isn't important), but there are better alternatives
(e.g. using trust authentication, as you suggest).

-Neil