Re: ACLs versus ALTER OWNER
От | Christopher Kings-Lynne |
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Тема | Re: ACLs versus ALTER OWNER |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 40BDE441.9020300@familyhealth.com.au обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: ACLs versus ALTER OWNER (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
Ответы |
Re: ACLs versus ALTER OWNER
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
> The problem here is not with pg_dump; the problem is that dropping > privileges doesn't cascade to dropping objects that are dependent on > those privileges. AFAICS the SQL spec requires us to be able to do > the latter. The spec really requires that?? So basically we have RESTRICT and CASCADE on REVOKE? That seems pretty odd to me. What's so wrong about allowing someone to create tables for a while and then revoking their permission to do it from now on?? That's exactly what we do for databases at the moment, we have an 'OWNER' clause. And that's how I coded tablespaces to be dumped as well. Either way, our concept of a superuser surely isn't in the spec, so can we at least fix that problem? ie. we dump lanugages as default session_authorization and then ALTER LANGUAGE it to change it to the correct user? Same for CREATE OPERATOR CLASS and ALTER OP CLASS, and CREATE CAST commands for binary-compatible casts. (I do note that neither of those ALTER forms allows changing owner and there is no ALTER CAST at all - we'd need to add them). > If we're gonna invest work on fixing this, we ought to do > what the spec tells us to, not invent warts on the security model. Sure. Let's be honest though and admit that there are a lot of broken dumps out there at the moment. For me, I have to change all my users to superusers before dumping, then change them all back after a restore. This is because we did a security crackdown and tightened up on everyone's privileges... Chris
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