Re: Enabling Checksums
От | Florian Pflug |
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Тема | Re: Enabling Checksums |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 39824EEF-9740-4440-A7E8-D0DD72229D2A@phlo.org обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: Enabling Checksums (Ants Aasma <ants@cybertec.at>) |
Ответы |
Re: Enabling Checksums
(Ants Aasma <ants@cybertec.at>)
|
Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Apr16, 2013, at 23:41 , Ants Aasma <ants@cybertec.at> wrote: > On Tue, Apr 16, 2013 at 11:20 PM, Florian Pflug <fgp@phlo.org> wrote: >> On Apr13, 2013, at 17:14 , Ants Aasma <ants@cybertec.at> wrote: >>> Based on current analysis, it is particularly good at detecting single >>> bit errors, as good at detecting burst errors as can be expected from >>> 16 bits and not horrible at detecting burst writes of zeroes. It is >>> quite bad at detecting multiple uncorrelated single bit errors and >>> extremely bad at detecting repeating patterns of errors in low order >>> bits. >> >> I've read the patch and tried to understand why it's that bad at >> detecting repeating patterns of errors in low order bits, and to see >> if there might be a way to fix that without too much of a performance >> impact. >> >> Here's what I gather the algorithm does: >> >> It treats the input data, a page of L bytes, as a Nx64 matrix V >> of 16-bit quantities (N = L/64, obviously). >> It then first computes (using two primes p (PRIME1) and q (PRIME2)) >> >> S = V[1,1]*p^63*q^63 + V[1,2]*p^63*q^62 + … + V[1,64]*p^63*q^0 >> + V[2,1]*p^62*q^63 + V[2,2]*p^62*q^62 + … + V[2,64]*p^62*q^0 >> + … >> + V[N,1]*p^0 *q^63 + V[N,2]*p^0 *q^62 + … + V[N,64]*p^0 *q^0 >> (mod 2^16) >> = sum V[i,j]*p^(64-i)*q^(64-j) >> >> Note that it does that by first computing the row-wise sums without >> the q^i coefficient, and then (in what the code calls the aggregation >> phase) combines those row-wise sums into a total, adding the q^i- >> coefficients along the way. >> >> The final hash value is then >> >> H = S * p + B * q mod 2^16 >> >> where B is a salt value intended to detect swapped pages (currently >> B is simply the page index) > > Great job analyzing the analytic form of the algorithm and sorry I you > had to do it instead finding it in the documentation. No problem, glad if I can help! >> This raises two question. First, why are there two primes? You could >> just as well using a single prime q and set p=q^64 mod 2^16. You then >> get >> S = sum V[i,j] * q^(64*(64-i) + (64-j) >> = sum V[i,j] * q^(4096 - 64*(i-1) - j) >> You get higher prime powers that way, but you can easily choose a prime >> that yields distinct values mod 2^16 for exponents up to 16383. Your >> PRIME2, for example, does. (It wraps around for 16384, i.e. >> PRIME2^16384 = 1 mod 2^16, but that's true for every possible prime since >> 16384 is the Carmichael function's value at 2^16) > > The experimental detection rate is about the same if we use a single > prime. But I think you have the analytical form wrong here. It should > be given q = p: > > S = sum V[i,j] * p^(64-i) * p^(64-j) > = sum V[i,j] * p^(64 - i + 64 - j) > = sum V[i,j] * p^(128 - i -j) Yeah, if you set q = p that's true. My suggestion was p=q^64 though... >> Second, why does it use addition instead of XOR? It seems that FNV >> usually XORs the terms together instead of adding them? > > Testing showed slightly better detection rate for adds. Intuitively I > think it's because the carry introduces some additional mixing. Hm, but OTOH it makes S linear in V, i.e. if you have two inputs V1,V2 and V = V1 + V2, then S = S1 + S2. Also, if V' = V*m, then S' = S*m. The second property is quite undesirable, I think. Assume all the V[i,j] are divisible by 2^k, i.e. have zeros at all bit positions 0..(k-1). Then, due to linearity, S is also divisible by 2^k, i.e. also has no ones before the k-th bit. This means, for example that if you hash values values which all have their lowest bit cleared, you get only 2^15 distinct hash values. If they all have the two lowest bits cleared, you get only 2^14 distinct values, and so on… Generally, linearity doesn't seem to be a property that one wants in a hash I think, so my suggestion is to stick to XOR. >> Here, btw, is a page on FNV hashing. It mentions a few rules for >> picking suitable primes >> >> http://www.isthe.com/chongo/tech/comp/fnv > > Unfortunately the rules don't apply here because of the hash size. Yeah :-(. I noticed that their 32-bit prime only has a single one outside the first 16 bits. Maybe we can take advantage of that and use a 32-bit state while still providing decent performance on machines without a 32-bit x 32-bit -> 32-bit multiply instruction? If we lived in an Intel-only world, I'd suggest going with a 32-bit state, since SSE4.1 support is *very* wide-spread already - the last CPUs without it came out over 5 years ago, I think. (Core2 and later support SSE4.1, and some later Core1 do too) But unfortunately things look bleak even for other x86 implementations - AMD support SSE4.1 only starting with Bulldozer, which came out 2011 or so I believe. Leaving the x86 realm, it seems that only ARM's NEON provides the instructions we'd need - AltiVec seems to be support only 16-bit multiplies, and from what some quick googling brought up, MIPS and SPARC SIMD instructions look no better.. OTOH, chances are that nobody will ever do SIMD implementations for those machines. In that case, working in 32-bit chunks instead of 16-bit chunks would be beneficial, since it requires half the number of instructions… best regards, Florian Pflug
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