Re: let's disallow ALTER ROLE bootstrap_superuser NOSUPERUSER
| От | Tom Lane |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: let's disallow ALTER ROLE bootstrap_superuser NOSUPERUSER |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | 39752.1658420887@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
| Ответ на | let's disallow ALTER ROLE bootstrap_superuser NOSUPERUSER (Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>) |
| Ответы |
Re: let's disallow ALTER ROLE bootstrap_superuser NOSUPERUSER
Re: let's disallow ALTER ROLE bootstrap_superuser NOSUPERUSER |
| Список | pgsql-hackers |
Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> writes:
> Currently, it's possible to remove the rolissuper bit from the
> bootstrap superuser, but this leaves that user - and the system in
> general - in an odd state. The bootstrap user continues to own all of
> the objects it owned before, e.g. all of the system catalogs. Direct
> DML on system catalogs is blocked by pg_class_aclmask_ext(), but it's
> possible to do things like rename a system function out of the way and
> create a new function with the same signature. Therefore, creating a
> new superuser and making the original one a non-superuser is probably
> not viable from a security perspective, because anyone who gained
> access to that role would likely have little difficulty mounting a
> Trojan horse attack against the current superusers.
True, but what if the idea is to have *no* superusers? I seem
to recall people being interested in setups like that.
On the whole I don't have any objection to your proposal, I just
worry that somebody else will.
Of course there's always "UPDATE pg_authid SET rolsuper = false",
which makes it absolutely clear that you're breaking the glass cover.
regards, tom lane
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