Re: sunsetting md5 password support
От | Tom Lane |
---|---|
Тема | Re: sunsetting md5 password support |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 2735114.1728599306@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: sunsetting md5 password support (Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net>) |
Ответы |
Re: sunsetting md5 password support
Re: sunsetting md5 password support |
Список | pgsql-hackers |
Andrew Dunstan <andrew@dunslane.net> writes: > Hmm, yeah. It would be easy enough to prevent MD5 passwords in things > like CREATE ROLE / ALTER ROLE, but harder to check for MD5 if there are > direct updates to pg_authid. Maybe we need to teach pg_dumpall a way to > do that as a workaround? That seems like a pretty awful idea. Having dump scripts that perform direct updates on pg_authid would lock us into supporting the current physical representation (ie that pg_authid is in fact a table with such-and-such columns) forever. Not to mention that no such script could be restored with anything less than full superuser privileges. And in return we're getting what exactly? On the whole I agree with Heikki's comment that we should just do it (disallow MD5, full stop) whenever we feel that enough time has passed. These intermediate states are mostly going to add headaches. Maybe we could do something with an intermediate release that just emits warnings, without any feature changes. regards, tom lane
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