Re: Relaxing SSL key permission checks
| От | Tom Lane |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: Relaxing SSL key permission checks |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | 26841.1455808669@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
| Ответ на | Relaxing SSL key permission checks (Christoph Berg <myon@debian.org>) |
| Ответы |
Re: Relaxing SSL key permission checks
Re: Relaxing SSL key permission checks Re: Relaxing SSL key permission checks |
| Список | pgsql-hackers |
Christoph Berg <myon@debian.org> writes:
> Currently the server insists on ssl_key_file's permissions to be 0600
> or less, and be owned by the database user. Debian has been patching
> be-secure.c since forever (the git history goes back to 8.2beta1) to
> relax that to 0640 or less, and owned by root or the database user.
Debian can do that if they like, but it's entirely unacceptable as an
across-the-board patch. Not all systems treat groups as being narrow
domains in which it's okay to assume that group-readable files are
secure enough to be keys. As an example, on OS X user files tend to be
group "staff" or "admin" which'd be close enough to world readable.
We could allow group-readable if we had some way to know whether to
trust the specific group, but I don't think there's any practical
way to do that. System conventions vary too much.
regards, tom lane
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