Greetings,
* Bruce Momjian (bruce@momjian.us) wrote:
> On Tue, May 25, 2021 at 09:42:48PM -0400, Stephen Frost wrote:
> > The nonce needs to be a new one, if we include the hint bits in the set
> > of data which is encrypted.
> >
> > However, what I believe folks are getting at here is that we could keep
> > the LSN the same, but increase the nonce when the hint bits change, but
> > *not* WAL log either the nonce change or the hint bit change (unless
> > it's being logged for some other reason, in which case log both), thus
> > reducing the amount of WAL being produced. What would matter is that
> > both the hint bit change and the new nonce hit disk at the same time, or
> > neither do, or we replay back to some state where the nonce and the hint
> > bits 'match up' so that the page decrypts (and the integrity check
> > works).
>
> How do we prevent torn pages if we are writing the page with a new
> nonce, and no WAL-logged full page image?
err, we'd still WAL the FPI, same as we do for checksums, that's what I
would expect and would think we'd need. As long as the FPI is in the
WAL since the last checkpoint, later changes to hint bits or the nonce
wouldn't matter- we'll replay the FPI and that'll have the right nonce
for the hint bits that were part of the FPI.
Any subsequent changes to the hint bits wouldn't be WAL'd though and
neither would the changes to the nonce and that all should be fine
because we'll blow away the entire page on crash recovery to push it
back to what it was when we first wrote the page after the last
checkpoint. Naturally, other changes which have to be WAL'd would still
be done but those would be replayed in shared buffers on top of the
prior FPI and the nonce set to some $new value (one which we know
couldn't have been used prior, by incrementing by some value) when we go
to write out that new page.
Thanks,
Stephen