On Fri, Oct 04, 2019 at 01:39:38PM -0700, Andres Freund wrote:
> but that reasoning seems bogus to me. For one, on just about any
> platform close always closes the fd, even when returning an error
> (unless you pass in a bad fd, in which case it obviously doesn't). So
> the reasoning that this fixes unnoticed fd leaks doesn't really seem to
> make sense. For another, even if it did, throwing an ERROR seems to
> achieve very little: We continue with a leaked fd *AND* we cause the
> operation to error out.
I have read again a couple of times the commit log, and this mentions
to let users know that a fd is leaking, not that it fixes things.
Still we get to know about it, while previously it was not possible.
In some cases we may see errors in close() after a previous write(2).
Of course this does not apply to all the code paths patched here, but
it seems to me that's a good habit to spread, no?
> I can see reasoning for:
> - LOG, so it can be noticed, but operations continue to work
> - FATAL, to fix the leak
> - PANIC, so we recover from the problem, in case of the close indicating
> a durability issue
LOG or WARNING would not be visible enough and would likely be skipped
by users. Not sure that this justifies a FATAL either, and PANIC
would cause more harm than necessary, so for most of them ERROR
sounded like a good compromise, still the elevel choice is not
innocent depending on the code paths patched, because the elevel used
is consistent with the error handling of the surroundings.
> And if your goal was just to achieve consistency, I also don't
> understand, because you left plenty close()'s unchecked? E.g. you added
> an error check in get_controlfile(), but not one in
> ReadControlFile(). alterSystemSetConfigFile() writes, but you didn't add
> one.
Because I have not considered these when looking at transient files.
That may be worth an extra lookup.
--
Michael