Bruce,
* Bruce Momjian (bruce@momjian.us) wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 01:25:00PM -0400, Stephen Frost wrote:
> > > I think the big win of Postgres doing the encryption is that the
> > > user-visible file system is no longer a target (assuming OS permissions
> > > are bypassed), while for file system encryption it is the storage device
> > > that is encrypted.
> >
> > If OS permissions are bypassed then the encryption isn't going to help
> > because the attacker can just access shared memory.
> >
> > The big wins for doing the encryption in PostgreSQL are, as Robert and I
> > have both mentioned on this thread already, that it provides
> > data-at-rest encryption in an easier to deploy fashion which will work
> > the same across different systems and allows the encrypted cluster to be
> > transferred more easily between systems. There are almsot certainly
> > other wins from having PG do the encryption, but the above strikes me as
> > the big ones, and those are certainly valuable enough on their own for
> > us to seriously consider adding this capability.
>
> Since you seem to be trying to shut down discussion, I will simply say I
> am unimpressed that this use-case is sufficient justification to add the
> feature.
I'm not trying to shut down discussion, I'm simply pointing out where
this feature will be helpful and where it won't be. If there's a way to
make it better and able to address an attack where the OS permission
system is bypassed, that'd be great, but I certainly don't know of any
way to do that and we don't want to claim that this feature will protect
against an attack vector that it won't.
If the lack of that means you don't support the feature, that's
unfortunate as it seems to imply, to me at least, that we'll never have
any kind of encryption because there's no way for it to prevent attacks
where the OS permission system is able to be bypassed.
Thanks!
Stephen