Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users
| От | Bruce Momjian |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | 20150829202712.GD28360@momjian.us обсуждение |
| Ответ на | Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users (Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>) |
| Ответы |
Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users
Re: Information of pg_stat_ssl visible to all users |
| Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 12:57:58PM -0400, Tom Lane wrote:
> Andres Freund <andres@anarazel.de> writes:
> > On 2015-07-07 12:03:36 -0400, Peter Eisentraut wrote:
> >> I think the DN is analogous to the remote user name, which we don't
> >> expose for any of the other authentication methods.
>
> > Huh?
>
> Peter's exactly right: there is no other case where you can tell what
> some other connection's actual OS username is. You might *guess* that
> it's the same as their database username, but you don't know that,
> assuming you don't know how they authenticated.
>
> I'm not sure how security-critical this info really is, though.
I know I am coming in late here, but I know Heroku uses random user
names to allow a cluster to have per-user databases without showing
external user name details:
=> \du List of roles Role name | Attributes |
Memberof----------------+------------------------------------------------+----------- aafgrwewediiqz | 20 connections
| {} aaszwkfnholarh | 20 connections | {} aatbelxbaeriwy |
20connections | {} aaxiwolkcxmbxo | 20 connections | {}
abbyljzgqaonjb| 20 connections | {}
I can see them having problems with a user being able to see the SSL
remote user names of all connected users.
-- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB
http://enterprisedb.com
+ Everyone has their own god. +
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