On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 11:37:04AM -0400, Andrew Dunstan wrote:
>
> On 08/15/2012 11:22 AM, Joe Conway wrote:
> >On 08/15/2012 06:48 AM, Tom Lane wrote:
> >>>On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 6:11 AM, Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> wrote:
> >>>>Is there a TODO here?
> >>If anybody's concerned about the security of our password storage,
> >>they'd be much better off working on improving the length and randomness
> >>of the salt string than replacing the md5 hash per se.
> >Or change to an md5 HMAC rather than straight md5 with salt. Last I
> >checked (which admittedly was a while ago) there were still no known
> >cryptographic weaknesses associated with an HMAC based on md5.
> >
>
>
>
> Possibly. I still think the right time to revisit this whole area
> will be when the NIST Hash Function competition ends supposedly
> later this year. See
> <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/timeline.html>. At that time we
> should probably consider moving our password handling to use the new
> standard function.
Are we really going to be comforable with a algorithm that is new?
-- Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us> http://momjian.us EnterpriseDB
http://enterprisedb.com
+ It's impossible for everything to be true. +