On Wed, May 26, 2010 at 10:54:42AM -0400, Tom Lane wrote:
> Garick Hamlin <ghamlin@isc.upenn.edu> writes:
> > I am guessing the problem is that validating the presented chain is hard?
>
> No, the problem is that the current libpq code fails to present the
> chain at all. It will only load and send the first cert in the
> postgresql.crt file. This works only when the client's cert is signed
> directly by one of the CAs trusted by the server.
Sorry, I just re-read your original message. You were clear, but I read
it wrong.
This is much less limiting than what I thought was being suggested. Having
a user's credentials work with only one trust anchor isn't that bad. I am
not familiar enough with openssl to know if there is a specific pitfall to
the change you suggested (which I think was what you were asking)..
One could make it work with multiple TAs in a similar fashion if it also
checked for the existence of a directory (like: ~/.postgresql/client_ta ) to
store chains to each supported TA by fingerprint.
That might not be worth the effort at this point...
Garick
>
> regards, tom lane