Re: Patch applied for SQL Injection vulnerability for setObject(int,Object,int)
| От | Oliver Jowett |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: Patch applied for SQL Injection vulnerability for setObject(int,Object,int) |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | 20030722063504.GA10522@opencloud.com обсуждение исходный текст |
| Ответ на | Patch applied for SQL Injection vulnerability for setObject(int,Object,int) (Barry Lind <blind@xythos.com>) |
| Ответы |
Re: Patch applied for SQL Injection vulnerability for setObject(int,Object,int)
Re: Patch applied for SQL Injection vulnerability for setObject(int,Object,int) |
| Список | pgsql-jdbc |
On Mon, Jul 21, 2003 at 10:49:14PM -0700, Barry Lind wrote:
> Given the ongoing discussion that this SQL injection vulnerability has
> caused, I decided not to apply the below patch from Kim and instead
> fixed the problem in a different way. The fix essentially applies the
> regular escaping done for setString to appropriate values passed to
> setObject. It does not however add quotes to the value. Thus existing
> uses of setObject for in clause and array type values will still
> continue to work.
I haven't looked at the updated tree yet, but from your description won't
this break code that does something like this? :
stmt = conn.prepareStatement("SELECT * FROM table WHERE string_key IN ?");
stmt.setObject(1, "('a', 'b', 'c')", Types.NUMERIC);
-O
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