Re: [HACKERS] Support for Secure Transport SSL library on macOS as OpenSSL alternative
| От | Tom Lane |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: [HACKERS] Support for Secure Transport SSL library on macOS as OpenSSL alternative |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | 19378.1537916899@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
| Ответ на | Re: [HACKERS] Support for Secure Transport SSL library on macOS asOpenSSL alternative (Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>) |
| Ответы |
Re: [HACKERS] Support for Secure Transport SSL library on macOS asOpenSSL alternative
(Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>)
|
| Список | pgsql-hackers |
Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi> writes:
> On 27/06/18 21:57, Daniel Gustafsson wrote:
>> Courtesy of the ever-present Murphy I managed to forget some testcode in
>> src/backend/Makefile which broke compilation for builds without secure
>> transport, attached v8 patch fixes that.
> I've read through this patch now in more detail. Looks pretty good, but
> I have a laundry list of little things below. The big missing item is
> documentation.
I did some simple testing on this today. The patch has bit-rotted,
mostly as a consequence of 77291139c which removed tls-unique channel
binding. That's probably a good thing for the Secure Transport code,
since it wasn't supporting that anyway, but it needs to be updated.
I ripped out the failing-to-compile code (maybe that was too simplistic?)
but could not figure out whether there was anything still useful about
the diffs in ssl/t/002_scram.pl, so I left those out. Anyway, the
attached update applies cleanly to today's HEAD, and the openssl part
still compiles cleanly and passes regression tests. The securetransport
part compiles cleanly, but it fails 8 of the 68 tests in 001_ssltests.pl.
I'm not sure how many of those might be new and how many were there as
of the previous submission.
> The "-framework" option, being added to CFLAGS, is clang specific. I
> think we need some more autoconf magic, to make this work with gcc.
AFAIK, Apple's "gcc" *is* clang; it certainly has no problem with
these switches (and I rather doubt there's any hope of linking to
Secure Transport without 'em). However, I agree that the technique
of teaching random makefiles about this explicitly is mighty ugly,
and we ought to put the logic into configure instead, if possible.
Possibly it could be modeled on LDAP_LIBS or ICU_LIBS, ie configure
sets up a macro that pulls in the openssl libraries, or the
secure transport libraries, or $other-implementation, or nothing.
The CFLAGS hacks need similar treatment (btw, should they be
CPPFLAGS hacks instead? I think they're morally equivalent to
-I switches). And avoid using "override" if at all possible.
Some other comments:
* I notice that contrib/sslinfo hasn't been touched. That probably
ought to be on the to-do list for this, though I don't insist that
it needs to be in the first commit.
* I'm not sure what the "keychain" additions to test/ssl/Makefile
are for, but they don't seem to be wired up to anything. Running
"make keychains" has no impact on the test failures, either.
* I do not like making the libpq connection parameters for this be
#ifdef'd out when the option isn't selected. I believe project policy is
that we accept all parameters always, and either ignore unsupported ones,
or throw errors if they're set to nondefault values (cf. the comment above
the sslmode parameter in fe-connect.c). I realize that some earlier
patches like GSSAPI did not get the word on this, but that's not a reason
to emulate their mistake. I'm not sure about the equivalent decision
w.r.t. backend GUCs, but we need to figure that out.
* In place of changes like
-#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_SSL) && defined(USE_OPENSSL)
I'd be inclined to just do "#ifdef USE_OPENSSL", ie assume that macro
can't be set without USE_SSL.
regards, tom lane
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 23ebfa8..6bdc96a 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -708,6 +708,7 @@ UUID_EXTRA_OBJS
with_uuid
with_systemd
with_selinux
+with_securetransport
with_openssl
with_ldap
with_krb_srvnam
@@ -854,6 +855,7 @@ with_bsd_auth
with_ldap
with_bonjour
with_openssl
+with_securetransport
with_selinux
with_systemd
with_readline
@@ -1554,6 +1556,7 @@ Optional Packages:
--with-ldap build with LDAP support
--with-bonjour build with Bonjour support
--with-openssl build with OpenSSL support
+ --with-securetransport build with Apple Secure Transport support
--with-selinux build with SELinux support
--with-systemd build with systemd support
--without-readline do not use GNU Readline nor BSD Libedit for editing
@@ -7968,6 +7971,41 @@ $as_echo "$with_openssl" >&6; }
#
+# Apple Secure Transport
+#
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with Apple Secure Transport support" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to build with Apple Secure Transport support... " >&6; }
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-securetransport was given.
+if test "${with_securetransport+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_securetransport;
+ case $withval in
+ yes)
+
+$as_echo "#define USE_SECURETRANSPORT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ ;;
+ no)
+ :
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_fn_error $? "no argument expected for --with-securetransport option" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+ esac
+
+else
+ with_securetransport=no
+
+fi
+
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $with_securetransport" >&5
+$as_echo "$with_securetransport" >&6; }
+
+
+#
# SELinux
#
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to build with SELinux support" >&5
@@ -12998,6 +13036,25 @@ fi
fi
+if test "$with_securetransport" = yes ; then
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "Security/Security.h" "ac_cv_header_Security_Security_h"
"$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_Security_Security_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <Security/Security.h> is required for Apple Secure Transport" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "CoreFoundation/CoreFoundation.h"
"ac_cv_header_CoreFoundation_CoreFoundation_h""$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_CoreFoundation_CoreFoundation_h" = xyes; then :
+
+else
+ as_fn_error $? "header file <CoreFoundation/CoreFoundation.h> is required for Apple Secure Transport" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
for ac_header in security/pam_appl.h
do :
diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
index 530f275..58c9883 100644
--- a/configure.in
+++ b/configure.in
@@ -841,6 +841,15 @@ AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_openssl])
AC_SUBST(with_openssl)
#
+# Apple Secure Transport
+#
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with Apple Secure Transport support])
+PGAC_ARG_BOOL(with, securetransport, no, [build with Apple Secure Transport support],
+ [AC_DEFINE([USE_SECURETRANSPORT], 1, [Define to build with Apple Secure Transport support.
(--with-securetransport)])])
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$with_securetransport])
+AC_SUBST(with_securetransport)
+
+#
# SELinux
#
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to build with SELinux support])
@@ -1367,6 +1376,11 @@ if test "$with_openssl" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADER(openssl/err.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <openssl/err.h> is required for OpenSSL])])
fi
+if test "$with_securetransport" = yes ; then
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(Security/Security.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <Security/Security.h> is required for Apple
SecureTransport])])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER(CoreFoundation/CoreFoundation.h, [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([header file <CoreFoundation/CoreFoundation.h> is
requiredfor Apple Secure Transport])])
+fi
+
if test "$with_pam" = yes ; then
AC_CHECK_HEADERS(security/pam_appl.h, [],
[AC_CHECK_HEADERS(pam/pam_appl.h, [],
diff --git a/src/Makefile.global.in b/src/Makefile.global.in
index 9cf0c35..48ee631 100644
--- a/src/Makefile.global.in
+++ b/src/Makefile.global.in
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ with_perl = @with_perl@
with_python = @with_python@
with_tcl = @with_tcl@
with_openssl = @with_openssl@
+with_securetransport = @with_securetransport@
with_selinux = @with_selinux@
with_systemd = @with_systemd@
with_gssapi = @with_gssapi@
diff --git a/src/backend/Makefile b/src/backend/Makefile
index 3a58bf6..a93b9a7 100644
--- a/src/backend/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/Makefile
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ ifeq ($(with_systemd),yes)
LIBS += -lsystemd
endif
+ifeq ($(with_securetransport),yes)
+LIBS += -framework CoreFoundation -framework Security
+endif
+
##########################################################################
all: submake-libpgport submake-catalog-headers submake-utils-headers postgres $(POSTGRES_IMP)
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
index 3dbec23..3f8a8b9 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/Makefile
@@ -21,4 +21,9 @@ ifeq ($(with_openssl),yes)
OBJS += be-secure-openssl.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_securetransport),yes)
+OBJS += be-secure-securetransport.o
+override CFLAGS += -framework Security -framework CoreFoundation
+endif
+
include $(top_srcdir)/src/backend/common.mk
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-securetransport.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-securetransport.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c3f36c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure-securetransport.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1447 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * be-secure-securetransport.c
+ * Apple Secure Transport support
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2018, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ * TODO:
+ * - It would be good to be able to set "not applicable" on some options
+ * like compression which isn't supported in Secure Transport (and most
+ * likely any other SSL libraries supported in the future).
+ * - Support memory allocation in Secure Transport via a custom Core
+ * Foundation allocator which is backed by a MemoryContext? Not sure it
+ * would be possible but would be interested to investigate.
+ *
+ *
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/backend/libpq/be-secure-securetransport.c
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres.h"
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "common/base64.h"
+#include "libpq/libpq.h"
+#include "miscadmin.h"
+#include "storage/fd.h"
+#include "storage/latch.h"
+#include "tcop/tcopprot.h"
+#include "utils/backend_random.h"
+#include "utils/memutils.h"
+
+/*
+ * TODO: This dance is required due to collisions in the CoreFoundation
+ * headers. How to handle it properly?
+ */
+#define pg_ACL_DELETE ACL_DELETE
+#define pg_ACL_EXECUTE ACL_EXECUTE
+#undef ACL_EXECUTE
+#undef ACL_DELETE
+#define Size pg_Size
+#define uint64 pg_uint64
+#include <Security/Security.h>
+#include <Security/SecureTransport.h>
+#include "common/securetransport.h"
+#undef uint64
+#undef Size
+#undef ACL_DELETE
+#undef ACL_EXECUTE
+#define pg_uint64 uint64
+#define pg_Size Size
+#define ACL_DELETE pg_ACL_DELETE
+#define ACL_EXECUTE pg_ACL_EXECUTE
+
+#ifndef errSecUnknownFormat
+#define errSecUnknownFormat -25257
+#endif
+
+#define KC_PREFIX "keychain:"
+#define KC_PREFIX_LEN (strlen("keychain:"))
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Struct definitions and Static variables */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * For Secure Transport API functions we rely on SecCopyErrorMessageString()
+ * which will provide a human readable error message for the individual error
+ * statuses. For our static functions, we mimic the behaviour by passing
+ * errSecInternalError and setting the error message in internal_err. Since we
+ * may have encountered an error due to memory pressure, we don't want to rely
+ * on dynamically allocating memory for this error message.
+ */
+#define ERR_MSG_LEN 128
+static char internal_err[ERR_MSG_LEN];
+
+static bool ssl_is_server_start;
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Prototypes */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * SecIdentityCreate is not an exported Secure Transport API. There is however
+ * no exported Secure Transport function that can create an identity from a
+ * SecCertificateRef and a SecKeyRef without having either of them in a
+ * Keychain. This function is commonly used in open source projects (such as
+ * ffmpeg and mono f.e), but finding an alternative is a TODO.
+ */
+extern SecIdentityRef SecIdentityCreate(CFAllocatorRef allocator,
+ SecCertificateRef certificate,
+ SecKeyRef privateKey);
+
+static bool load_key(char *name, CFArrayRef *out);
+static OSStatus load_keychain(char *name, CFArrayRef *keychains);
+static OSStatus load_certificate_file(char *name, CFArrayRef *cert_array);
+static OSStatus load_identity_keychain(const char *common_name,
+ SecIdentityRef *identity,
+ CFArrayRef keychains);
+
+static int load_dh_file(char *filename, char **buf);
+static void load_dh_params(char *dh, int len, bool is_pem, SSLContextRef ssl);
+static char * pg_SSLerrmessage(OSStatus status);
+static OSStatus pg_SSLSocketWrite(SSLConnectionRef conn, const void *data, size_t *len);
+static OSStatus pg_SSLSocketRead(SSLConnectionRef conn, void *data, size_t *len);
+static void KeychainEnsureValid(CFArrayRef *keychains);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Backend API */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_init
+ * Initialize global Secure Transport structures (if any)
+ *
+ * This is where we'd like to load and parse certificates and private keys
+ * for the connection, but since Secure Transport will spawn threads deep
+ * inside the API we must postpone this until inside a backend. This means
+ * that we won't fail on an incorrect certificate chain until a connection
+ * is attempted, unlike with OpenSSL where we fail immediately on server
+ * startup.
+ *
+ * Another reason to defer this until when in the backend is that Keychains
+ * are SQLite3 backed, and sqlite does not allow access across a fork. See
+ * https://sqlite.org/faq.html#q6 for more information.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_init(bool isServerStart)
+{
+ memset(internal_err, '\0', sizeof(internal_err));
+
+ ssl_is_server_start = isServerStart;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_destroy
+ * Tear down global Secure Transport structures and return resources.
+ */
+void
+be_tls_destroy(void)
+{
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_open_server
+ * Attempt to negotiate a secure connection
+ *
+ * Unlike the OpenSSL backend, this function is responsible for the deferred
+ * loading of keys and certificates for use in the connection. See the comment
+ * on be_tls_init for further reasoning around this.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_open_server(Port *port)
+{
+ OSStatus status;
+ SecTrustRef trust;
+ SecTrustResultType trust_eval;
+ SecIdentityRef identity;
+ CFArrayRef root_certificates;
+ CFArrayRef certificates;
+ CFArrayRef keys;
+ CFArrayRef keychains = NULL;
+ CFMutableArrayRef chain;
+ char *dh_buf;
+ int dh_len;
+
+ Assert(!port->ssl);
+
+ if (ssl_keychain_file[0])
+ {
+ status = load_keychain(ssl_keychain_file, &keychains);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("could not load keychain(s): \"%s\"",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the ssl_cert_file is prefixed with a keychain reference, we will try
+ * to load a complete identity from the Keychain.
+ */
+ if (pg_strncasecmp(ssl_cert_file, KC_PREFIX, KC_PREFIX_LEN) == 0)
+ status = load_identity_keychain(ssl_cert_file + KC_PREFIX_LEN, &identity, keychains);
+ else
+ {
+ status = load_certificate_file(ssl_cert_file, &certificates);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("could not load server certificate \"%s\": \"%s\"",
+ ssl_cert_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+
+ if (!load_key(ssl_key_file, &keys))
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * We now have a certificate and either a private key, or a search path
+ * which should contain it.
+ */
+ identity = SecIdentityCreate(NULL,
+ (SecCertificateRef) CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(certificates, 0),
+ (SecKeyRef) CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(keys, 0));
+ }
+
+ if (identity == NULL)
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("could not create identity: \"%s\"",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+
+ /*
+ * SSLSetCertificate() sets the certificate(s) to use for the connection.
+ * The first element in the passed array is required to be the identity
+ * with elements 1..n being certificates.
+ */
+ chain = CFArrayCreateMutable(NULL, 0, &kCFTypeArrayCallBacks);
+ CFRetain(identity);
+ CFArrayInsertValueAtIndex(chain, 0, identity);
+ CFArrayAppendArray(chain, certificates,
+ CFRangeMake(0, CFArrayGetCount(certificates)));
+
+ /*
+ * Load the Certificate Authority if configured
+ */
+ if (ssl_ca_file[0])
+ {
+ status = load_certificate_file(ssl_ca_file, &root_certificates);
+ if (status == noErr)
+ {
+ CFArrayAppendArray(chain, root_certificates,
+ CFRangeMake(0, CFArrayGetCount(root_certificates)));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ ereport(LOG,
+ (errmsg("could not load root certificate \"%s\": \"%s\"",
+ ssl_ca_file, pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
+
+ /*
+ * Certificate Revocation List are not supported in the Secure Transport
+ * API
+ */
+ if (ssl_crl_file[0])
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("CRL files not supported with Secure Transport")));
+
+ port->ssl = (void *) SSLCreateContext(NULL, kSSLServerSide, kSSLStreamType);
+ if (!port->ssl)
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("could not create SSL context")));
+
+ port->ssl_in_use = true;
+ port->ssl_buffered = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We use kTryAuthenticate here since we don't know which sslmode the
+ * client is using. If we were to use kAlwaysAuthenticate then sslmode
+ * require won't work as intended.
+ */
+ if (ssl_loaded_verify_locations)
+ SSLSetClientSideAuthenticate((SSLContextRef) port->ssl, kTryAuthenticate);
+
+ /*
+ * In case the user hasn't configured a DH parameters file, we load a pre-
+ * computed DH parameter to avoid having Secure Transport computing one for
+ * us (which is done by default unless one is set).
+ */
+ dh_buf = NULL;
+ if (ssl_dh_params_file[0])
+ dh_len = load_dh_file(ssl_dh_params_file, &dh_buf);
+
+ if (!dh_buf || dh_len == 0)
+ {
+ dh_buf = pstrdup(FILE_DH2048);
+ dh_len = sizeof(FILE_DH2048);
+ }
+
+ load_dh_params(dh_buf, dh_len, true, (SSLContextRef) port->ssl);
+
+ /*
+ * Set Tlsv1.2 as the minimum protocol version we allow for the connection
+ */
+ status = SSLSetProtocolVersionMin((SSLContextRef) port->ssl,
+ kTLSProtocol12);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("could not set protocol for connection: \"%s\"",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+
+ status = SSLSetCertificate((SSLContextRef) port->ssl,
+ (CFArrayRef) chain);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("could not set certificate for connection: \"%s\"",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+
+ status = SSLSetIOFuncs((SSLContextRef) port->ssl,
+ pg_SSLSocketRead,
+ pg_SSLSocketWrite);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL IO functions: \"%s\"",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+
+ status = SSLSetSessionOption((SSLContextRef) port->ssl,
+ kSSLSessionOptionBreakOnClientAuth, true);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("could not set SSL certificate validation: \"%s\"",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+
+ status = SSLSetConnection((SSLContextRef) port->ssl, port);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errmsg("could not establish SSL connection: \"%s\"",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+
+ /*
+ * We can't initiate the SSL structures in _init as per how OpenSSL does
+ * it, so we can't use serverstart for the same error handling. We still
+ * use it for a few things so maintain it for a single instantiation.
+ * TODO: it would be neat if this hack isn't required, more thinking is
+ * required.
+ */
+ ssl_is_server_start = false;
+
+ /*
+ * Perform handshake
+ */
+ for (;;)
+ {
+ status = SSLHandshake((SSLContextRef) port->ssl);
+ if (status == noErr)
+ break;
+
+ if (status == errSSLWouldBlock)
+ continue;
+
+ if (status == errSSLClosedAbort || status == errSSLClosedGraceful)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (status == errSSLPeerAuthCompleted)
+ {
+ status = SSLCopyPeerTrust((SSLContextRef) port->ssl, &trust);
+ if (status != noErr || trust == NULL)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("SSLCopyPeerTrust returned: \"%s\"",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_loaded_verify_locations)
+ {
+ status = SecTrustSetAnchorCertificates(trust, root_certificates);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("SecTrustSetAnchorCertificates returned: \"%s\"",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ status = SecTrustSetAnchorCertificatesOnly(trust, false);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("SecTrustSetAnchorCertificatesOnly returned: \"%s\"",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ trust_eval = 0;
+ status = SecTrustEvaluate(trust, &trust_eval);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ {
+ ereport(WARNING,
+ (errmsg("SecTrustEvaluate failed, returned: \"%s\"",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ switch (trust_eval)
+ {
+ /*
+ * If 'Unspecified' then an anchor certificate was reached
+ * without encountering any explicit user trust. If 'Proceed'
+ * then the user has chosen to explicitly trust a certificate
+ * in the chain by clicking "Trust" in the Keychain app.
+ */
+ case kSecTrustResultUnspecified:
+ case kSecTrustResultProceed:
+ port->peer_cert_valid = true;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * 'RecoverableTrustFailure' indicates that the certificate was
+ * rejected but might be trusted with minor changes to the eval
+ * context (ignoring expired certificate etc). In the frontend
+ * we can in some circumstances allow this, but in the backend
+ * this always means that the client certificate is considered
+ * untrusted.
+ */
+ case kSecTrustResultRecoverableTrustFailure:
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Treat all other cases as rejection without further
+ * questioning.
+ */
+ default:
+ port->peer_cert_valid = false;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (port->peer_cert_valid)
+ {
+ SecCertificateRef usercert;
+ CFStringRef usercert_cn;
+ const char *peer_cn;
+
+ usercert = SecTrustGetCertificateAtIndex(trust, 0L);
+ SecCertificateCopyCommonName(usercert, &usercert_cn);
+
+ /* Guard against empty/missing CNs */
+ peer_cn = CFStringGetCStringPtr(usercert_cn, kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
+ if (!peer_cn)
+ port->peer_cn = pstrdup("");
+ else
+ port->peer_cn = pstrdup(peer_cn);
+
+ CFRelease(usercert_cn);
+ }
+
+ CFRelease(trust);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (status != noErr)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * load_key
+ * Extracts a key from a PEM file on the filesystem
+ */
+static bool
+load_key(char *name, CFArrayRef *out)
+{
+ OSStatus status;
+ struct stat stat_buf;
+ int ret;
+ UInt8 *buf;
+ FILE *fd;
+ CFDataRef data;
+ SecExternalFormat format;
+ SecExternalItemType type;
+ CFStringRef path;
+ SecItemImportExportKeyParameters params;
+
+ if (!check_ssl_key_file_permissions(name, ssl_is_server_start))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * check_ssl_key_file_permissions() has already checked the file for
+ * existence and correct permissions, but we still need to stat it to
+ * get the filesize.
+ */
+ if (stat(name, &stat_buf) != 0)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+ errmsg("could not load private key \"%s\": unable to open",
+ name)));
+
+ if ((fd = AllocateFile(name, "r")) == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+ errmsg("could not load private key \"%s\": unable to open",
+ name)));
+
+ buf = palloc(stat_buf.st_size);
+
+ ret = fread(buf, 1, stat_buf.st_size, fd);
+ FreeFile(fd);
+
+ if (ret != stat_buf.st_size)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+ errmsg("could not load private key \"%s\": unable to read",
+ name)));
+
+ type = kSecItemTypePrivateKey;
+ format = kSecFormatPEMSequence;
+ path = CFStringCreateWithCString(NULL, name, kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
+ data = CFDataCreate(NULL, buf, stat_buf.st_size);
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(SecItemImportExportKeyParameters));
+ params.version = SEC_KEY_IMPORT_EXPORT_PARAMS_VERSION;
+ /* Set OS default access control on the imported key */
+ params.flags = kSecKeyNoAccessControl;
+
+ status = SecItemImport(data, path, &format, &type, 0, ¶ms, NULL, out);
+
+ /*
+ * There is no way to set a callback for acquiring the passphrase like how
+ * OpenSSL does it, so we need to re-run the import if it failed with a
+ * passphrase missing status. If no ssl_passphrase_command has been set we
+ * currently don't retry, which is something that will need to be revisited.
+ * TODO: figure out what would be the least confusing to the user here;
+ * perhaps supplying our own fallback passphrase_command? (which should be
+ * a TLS backend common function since it wouldn't be Secure Transport
+ * specific?)
+ */
+ if (status == errSecPassphraseRequired)
+ {
+ if ((ssl_is_server_start && ssl_passphrase_command[0]) ||
+ (!ssl_is_server_start && ssl_passphrase_command[0] && ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload))
+ {
+ const char *prompt = "Enter PEM pass phrase: ";
+ char buf[256];
+ CFStringRef passphrase;
+
+ run_ssl_passphrase_command(prompt, ssl_is_server_start, buf, sizeof(buf));
+
+ passphrase = CFStringCreateWithCString(NULL, buf, kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
+ params.passphrase = passphrase;
+ memset(&buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+
+ status = SecItemImport(data, path, &format, &type, 0, ¶ms, NULL, out);
+
+ CFRelease(passphrase);
+ }
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+ errmsg("private key file \"%s\" cannot be loaded because it requires a passphrase",
+ name)));
+ }
+
+ CFRelease(path);
+ CFRelease(data);
+
+ if (status != noErr)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+ errmsg("could not load private key \"%s\": \"%s\"",
+ name, pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * load_keychain
+ * Open the specified, and default, Keychain
+ *
+ * Operations on keychains other than the default take the keychain references
+ * in an array. We need to copy a reference to the default keychain into the
+ * array to include it in the search.
+ *
+ * For server applications, we don't want modal dialog boxes opened for
+ * Keychain interaction. Calling SecKeychainSetUserInteractionAllowed(FALSE)
+ * will turn off all GUI interaction with the user, which may seem like what we
+ * want server side. This however has the side effect to turn off all GUI
+ * elements for all applications until some application calls
+ * SecKeychainSetUserInteractionAllowed(TRUE) or reboots the box. We might thus
+ * remove wanted GUI interaction from another app, or another app might
+ * introduce it for us.
+ */
+static OSStatus
+load_keychain(char *name, CFArrayRef *keychains)
+{
+ OSStatus status;
+ struct stat stat_buf;
+ SecKeychainRef kc[2];
+ int array_len = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * If we are passing in a non-empty CFArrayRef, and fail to load the user
+ * Keychain then we would risk injecting Keychains since we will trust this
+ * array from hereon. Unconditionally error out hard immediately to avoid.
+ */
+ if (*keychains != NULL)
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("Requesting to load Keychains into already allocated memory")));
+
+ if (stat(name, &stat_buf) != 0)
+ return errSecInvalidValue;
+
+ status = SecKeychainOpen(name, &kc[0]);
+ if (status == noErr)
+ {
+ SecKeychainUnlock(kc[0], 0, "", TRUE);
+
+ /*
+ * If we are allowed to use the default Keychain, add it to the array
+ * to include it in Keychain searches. If we are only using the default
+ * Keychain and no user defined Keychain we don't create an array at
+ * all since the recommended procedure is to pass NULL instead of an
+ * array containing only a reference to the default Keychain.
+ */
+ if (ssl_keychain_use_default)
+ SecKeychainCopyDefault(&kc[array_len++]);
+
+ *keychains = CFArrayCreate(NULL, (const void **) kc, array_len,
+ &kCFTypeArrayCallBacks);
+
+ if (!*keychains)
+ {
+ snprintf(internal_err, ERR_MSG_LEN, "unable to allocate memory");
+ return errSecInternalError;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * import_identity_keychain
+ * Import the identity for the specified certificate from a Keychain
+ *
+ * Queries the specified Keychain, or the default unless not defined, for a
+ * identity with a certificate matching the passed certificate reference.
+ * Keychains are searched by creating a dictionary of key/value pairs with the
+ * search criteria and then asking for a copy of the matching entry/entries to
+ * the search criteria.
+ */
+static OSStatus
+load_identity_keychain(const char *common_name, SecIdentityRef *identity,
+ CFArrayRef keychains)
+{
+ OSStatus status = errSecItemNotFound;
+ CFMutableDictionaryRef query;
+ CFStringRef cert;
+ CFArrayRef temp;
+
+ /* Ensure we have a correctly set Keychains array */
+ KeychainEnsureValid(&keychains);
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure the user didn't just specify keychain: as the sslcert config.
+ * The passed certificate will have the keychain prefix stripped so in that
+ * case the string is expected to be empty here.
+ */
+ if (strlen(common_name) == 0)
+ return errSecInvalidValue;
+
+ query = CFDictionaryCreateMutable(NULL, 0,
+ &kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks,
+ &kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks);
+
+ cert = CFStringCreateWithCString(NULL, common_name, kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
+
+ /*
+ * If we didn't get a Keychain passed, skip adding it to the dictionary
+ * thus prompting a search in the users default Keychain.
+ */
+ if (keychains)
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecMatchSearchList, keychains);
+
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecClass, kSecClassIdentity);
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecReturnRef, kCFBooleanTrue);
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecMatchLimit, kSecMatchLimitAll);
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecMatchPolicy, SecPolicyCreateSSL(true, NULL));
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecAttrLabel, cert);
+
+ /*
+ * Normally we could have used kSecMatchLimitOne in the above dictionary
+ * but since there are versions of macOS where the certificate matching on
+ * the label doesn't work, we need to request all and find the one we want.
+ * Copy all the results to a temp array and scan it for the certificate we
+ * are interested in.
+ */
+ status = SecItemCopyMatching(query, (CFTypeRef *) &temp);
+ if (status == noErr)
+ {
+ OSStatus search_stat;
+ SecIdentityRef dummy;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < CFArrayGetCount(temp); i++)
+ {
+ SecCertificateRef search_cert;
+ CFStringRef cn;
+
+ dummy = (SecIdentityRef) CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(temp, i);
+ search_stat = SecIdentityCopyCertificate(dummy, &search_cert);
+
+ if (search_stat == noErr && search_cert != NULL)
+ {
+ SecCertificateCopyCommonName(search_cert, &cn);
+ if (CFStringCompare(cn, cert, 0) == kCFCompareEqualTo)
+ {
+ CFRelease(cn);
+ CFRelease(search_cert);
+ *identity = (SecIdentityRef) CFRetain(dummy);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ CFRelease(cn);
+ CFRelease(search_cert);
+ }
+ }
+
+ CFRelease(temp);
+ }
+
+ CFRelease(query);
+ CFRelease(cert);
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * load_certificate_file
+ * Extracts a certificate from a PEM file on the filesystem
+ */
+static OSStatus
+load_certificate_file(char *name, CFArrayRef *cert_array)
+{
+ struct stat stat_buf;
+ int ret;
+ UInt8 *buf;
+ FILE *fd;
+ CFDataRef data;
+ SecExternalFormat format;
+ SecExternalItemType type;
+ CFStringRef path;
+ OSStatus status;
+
+ ret = stat(name, &stat_buf);
+ if (ret != 0 && errno == ENOENT)
+ {
+ snprintf(internal_err, ERR_MSG_LEN, "unable to find file");
+ return errSecInternalError;
+ }
+ else if (ret == 0 && S_ISREG(stat_buf.st_mode))
+ {
+ if ((fd = AllocateFile(name, "r")) == NULL)
+ {
+ snprintf(internal_err, ERR_MSG_LEN, "unable to open file for reading");
+ return errSecInternalError;
+ }
+
+ buf = palloc(stat_buf.st_size);
+ ret = fread(buf, 1, stat_buf.st_size, fd);
+ FreeFile(fd);
+
+ if (ret != stat_buf.st_size)
+ {
+ snprintf(internal_err, ERR_MSG_LEN, "unable to read file");
+ return errSecInternalError;
+ }
+
+ type = kSecItemTypeCertificate;
+ format = kSecFormatPEMSequence;
+ path = CFStringCreateWithCString(NULL, name, kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
+ data = CFDataCreate(NULL, buf, stat_buf.st_size);
+
+ status = SecItemImport(data, path, &format, &type, 0, NULL, NULL,
+ cert_array);
+ pfree(buf);
+
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ snprintf(internal_err, ERR_MSG_LEN, "unable to open file for reading");
+ return errSecInternalError;
+}
+
+/*
+ * load_dh_file
+ * Slurp the contents of the specified file into buf
+ *
+ * Open the supplied filename and load its contents. This function is only
+ * reading the data without assessing its structure, actually parsing it is
+ * performed by load_dh_params(). The reason for splitting up the process is
+ * that we also support loading hardcoded DH params.
+ */
+static int
+load_dh_file(char *filename, char **buf)
+{
+ FILE *dh;
+ struct stat stat_buf;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Open the DH file and slurp the contents. If the file doesn't exist it's
+ * not an error, if it can't be opened it is however an error.
+ */
+ ret = stat(filename, &stat_buf);
+ if (ret != 0 && errno == ENOENT)
+ return 0;
+ else if (ret == 0 && S_ISREG(stat_buf.st_mode))
+ {
+ if ((dh = AllocateFile(filename, "r")) == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode_for_file_access(),
+ errmsg("could not open DH parameters file \"%s\": %m",
+ filename)));
+
+ *buf = palloc(stat_buf.st_size);
+ ret = fread(*buf, 1, stat_buf.st_size, dh);
+ FreeFile(dh);
+
+ if (ret != stat_buf.st_size)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode_for_file_access(),
+ errmsg("could not read DH parameters file \"%s\": %m",
+ filename)));
+ }
+ else
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode_for_file_access(),
+ errmsg("DH parameters file \"%s\" is not a regular file",
+ filename)));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * load_dh_params
+ * Load the specified DH params for the connection
+ *
+ * Secure Transport requires the DH params to be in DER format, but to be
+ * compatible with the OpenSSL code we also support PEM and convert to DER
+ * before loading. Conversion does rudimentary PEM parsing, if we miss the
+ * data being correct, the Secure Transport API will give an error anyways so
+ * we're just checking basic integrity.
+ *
+ * This function may scribble on the dh parameter so if that's required so stay
+ * intact in the caller, a copy should be sent.
+ */
+#define DH_HEADER "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----"
+#define DH_FOOTER "-----END DH PARAMETERS-----"
+static void
+load_dh_params(char *dh, int len, bool is_pem, SSLContextRef ssl)
+{
+ OSStatus status;
+ char *der;
+ int der_len;
+
+ Assert(dh);
+
+ /* Convert PEM to DER */
+ if (is_pem)
+ {
+ char *head;
+ char *tail;
+ int pem_len = 0;
+
+ if (strstr(dh, DH_HEADER) == NULL)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+ errmsg("Invalid PEM format for DH parameter, header missing")));
+
+ dh += strlen(DH_HEADER);
+ tail = strstr(dh, DH_FOOTER);
+ if (!tail)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+ errmsg("Invalid PEM format for DH parameter, footer missing")));
+ *tail = '\0';
+
+ /* In order to PEM convert it we need to remove all newlines */
+ head = dh;
+ tail = dh;
+ while (*head != '\0')
+ {
+ if (*head != '\n')
+ {
+ *tail++ = *head++;
+ pem_len++;
+ }
+ else
+ head++;
+ }
+ *tail = '\0';
+
+ der = palloc(pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(dh)) + 1);
+ der_len = pg_b64_decode(dh, strlen(dh), der);
+ der[der_len] = '\0';
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ der = dh;
+ der_len = len;
+ }
+
+ status = SSLSetDiffieHellmanParams(ssl, der, der_len);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
+ errmsg("unable to load DH parameters: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_close
+ * Close SSL connection.
+ */
+void
+be_tls_close(Port *port)
+{
+ OSStatus ssl_status;
+
+ if (!port->ssl)
+ return;
+
+ ssl_status = SSLClose((SSLContextRef) port->ssl);
+ if (ssl_status != noErr)
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("error in closing SSL connection: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(ssl_status))));
+
+ CFRelease((SSLContextRef) port->ssl);
+
+ port->ssl = NULL;
+ port->ssl_in_use = false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_version
+ * Retrieve the protocol version of the current connection
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_version(Port *port)
+{
+ OSStatus status;
+ SSLProtocol protocol;
+
+ if (!(SSLContextRef) port->ssl)
+ elog(ERROR, "No SSL connection");
+
+ status = SSLGetNegotiatedProtocolVersion((SSLContextRef) port->ssl, &protocol);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("could not detect TLS version for connection: \"%s\"",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+
+ if (protocol == kTLSProtocol11)
+ return "TLSv1.1";
+ else if (protocol == kTLSProtocol12)
+ return "TLSv1.2";
+
+ return "unknown";
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_read
+ * Read data from a secure connection.
+ */
+ssize_t
+be_tls_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ size_t n = 0;
+ ssize_t ret;
+ OSStatus read_status;
+ SSLContextRef ssl = (SSLContextRef) port->ssl;
+
+ errno = 0;
+
+ if (len <= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ read_status = SSLRead(ssl, ptr, len, &n);
+ switch (read_status)
+ {
+ case noErr:
+ ret = n;
+ break;
+
+ /* Function is blocked, waiting for I/O */
+ case errSSLWouldBlock:
+ if (port->ssl_buffered)
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_WRITEABLE;
+ else
+ *waitfor = WL_SOCKET_READABLE;
+
+ errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+ if (n == 0)
+ ret = -1;
+ else
+ ret = n;
+
+ break;
+
+ case errSSLClosedGraceful:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * If the connection was closed for an unforeseen reason, return error
+ * and set errno such that the caller can raise an appropriate ereport
+ */
+ case errSSLClosedNoNotify:
+ case errSSLClosedAbort:
+ ret = -1;
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ ret = -1;
+ ereport(COMMERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
+ errmsg("SSL error: %s",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(read_status))));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_write
+ * Write data to a secure connection.
+ */
+ssize_t
+be_tls_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len, int *waitfor)
+{
+ size_t n = 0;
+ OSStatus write_status;
+
+ errno = 0;
+
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * SSLWrite returns the number of bytes written in the 'n' argument. This
+ * however can be data either actually written to the socket, or buffered
+ * in the context. In the latter case SSLWrite will return errSSLWouldBlock
+ * and we need to call it with no new data (NULL) to drain the buffer on to
+ * the socket. We track the buffer in ssl_buffered and clear that when all
+ * data has been drained.
+ */
+ if (port->ssl_buffered > 0)
+ {
+ write_status = SSLWrite((SSLContextRef) port->ssl, NULL, 0, &n);
+
+ if (write_status == noErr)
+ {
+ n = port->ssl_buffered;
+ port->ssl_buffered = 0;
+ }
+ else if (write_status == errSSLWouldBlock || write_status == -1)
+ {
+ n = -1;
+ errno = EINTR;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ n = -1;
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ write_status = SSLWrite((SSLContextRef) port->ssl, ptr, len, &n);
+
+ switch (write_status)
+ {
+ case noErr:
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * The data was buffered in the context rather than written to the
+ * socket. Track this and repeatedly call SSLWrite to drain the
+ * buffer. See comment above.
+ */
+ case errSSLWouldBlock:
+ port->ssl_buffered = len;
+ n = 0;
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ /* Clean disconnections */
+ case errSSLClosedNoNotify:
+ /* fall through */
+ case errSSLClosedGraceful:
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ n = -1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ errno = ECONNRESET;
+ n = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_cipher_bits
+ * Returns the number of bits in the encryption for the current cipher
+ *
+ * Note: In case of errors, this returns 0 to match the OpenSSL implementation.
+ * A NULL encryption will however also return 0 making it complicated to
+ * differentiate between the two.
+ */
+int
+be_tls_get_cipher_bits(Port *port)
+{
+ OSStatus status;
+ SSLCipherSuite cipher;
+
+ if (!(SSLContextRef) port->ssl)
+ return 0;
+
+ status = SSLGetNegotiatedCipher((SSLContextRef) port->ssl, &cipher);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ return 0;
+
+ return pg_SSLcipherbits(cipher);
+}
+
+void
+be_tls_get_peerdn_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ OSStatus status;
+ SecTrustRef trust;
+ SecCertificateRef cert;
+ CFStringRef dn_str;
+
+ if (!ptr || len == 0)
+ return;
+
+ ptr[0] = '\0';
+
+ if (!(SSLContextRef) port->ssl)
+ return;
+
+ status = SSLCopyPeerTrust((SSLContextRef) port->ssl, &trust);
+ if (status == noErr && trust != NULL)
+ {
+ /*
+ * TODO: copy the certificate parts with SecCertificateCopyValues and
+ * parse the OIDs to build up the DN
+ */
+ cert = SecTrustGetCertificateAtIndex(trust, 0);
+ dn_str = SecCertificateCopyLongDescription(NULL, cert, NULL);
+ if (dn_str)
+ {
+ strlcpy(ptr, CFStringGetCStringPtr(dn_str, kCFStringEncodingASCII), len);
+ CFRelease(dn_str);
+ }
+
+ CFRelease(trust);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_cipher
+ * Return the negotiated ciphersuite for the current connection.
+ */
+const char *
+be_tls_get_cipher(Port *port)
+{
+ OSStatus status;
+ SSLCipherSuite cipher;
+ const char *cipher_name;
+
+ if (!(SSLContextRef) port->ssl)
+ elog(ERROR, "No SSL connection");
+
+ status = SSLGetNegotiatedCipher((SSLContextRef) port->ssl, &cipher);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errmsg("could not detect cipher for connection: \"%s\"",
+ pg_SSLerrmessage(status))));
+
+ cipher_name = pg_SSLciphername(cipher);
+ if (cipher_name == NULL)
+ elog(ERROR, "Unknown cipher detected");
+
+ return cipher_name;
+}
+
+/*
+ * be_tls_get_compression
+ * Retrieve and return whether compression is used for the current
+ * connection.
+ *
+ * Since Secure Transport doesn't support compression at all, always return
+ * false here. Ideally we should be able to tell the caller that the option
+ * isn't applicable rather than return false, but the current SSL support
+ * doesn't allow for that.
+ */
+bool
+be_tls_get_compression(Port *port)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions - Translation */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLerrmessage
+ * Create and return a human readable error message given
+ * the specified status code
+ *
+ * While only interesting to use for error cases, the function will return a
+ * translation for non-error statuses as well like noErr and errSecSuccess.
+ */
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(OSStatus status)
+{
+ CFStringRef err_msg;
+ char *err_buf;
+
+ /*
+ * While errSecUnknownFormat has been defined as -25257 at least since 10.8
+ * Lion, there still is no translation for it in 10.11 El Capitan, so we
+ * maintain our own.
+ */
+ if (status == errSecUnknownFormat)
+ return pstrdup(_("The item you are trying to import has an unknown format."));
+
+ /*
+ * The Secure Transport supplied error string for invalid passphrase only
+ * reads "invalid attribute" without any reference to a passphrase, which
+ * can be confusing. Override with our own.
+ */
+ if (status == errSecInvalidAttributePassphrase)
+ return pstrdup(_("Incorrect passphrase."));
+
+ if (status == errSSLRecordOverflow)
+ return pstrdup(_("SSL error"));
+
+ /*
+ * If the error is internal, and we have an error message in the internal
+ * buffer, then return that error and clear the internal buffer.
+ */
+ if (status == errSecInternalError && internal_err[0])
+ {
+ err_buf = pstrdup(internal_err);
+ memset(internal_err, '\0', ERR_MSG_LEN);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ err_msg = SecCopyErrorMessageString(status, NULL);
+
+ if (err_msg)
+ {
+ err_buf = pstrdup(CFStringGetCStringPtr(err_msg,
+ kCFStringEncodingUTF8));
+ CFRelease(err_msg);
+ }
+ else
+ err_buf = pstrdup(_("unknown SSL error"));
+ }
+
+ return err_buf;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions - Socket IO */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLSocketRead
+ *
+ * Callback for reading data from the connection. When entering the function,
+ * len is set to the number of bytes requested. Upon leaving, len should be
+ * overwritten with the actual number of bytes read.
+ */
+static OSStatus
+pg_SSLSocketRead(SSLConnectionRef conn, void *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ OSStatus status;
+ int res;
+
+ res = secure_raw_read((Port *) conn, data, *len);
+
+ if (res < 0)
+ {
+ switch (errno)
+ {
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ case EAGAIN:
+#endif
+#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (!defined(EAGAIN) || (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN))
+ case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#endif
+ case EINTR:
+ status = errSSLWouldBlock;
+ break;
+ case ENOENT:
+ status = errSSLClosedGraceful;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ status = errSSLClosedAbort;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ *len = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = noErr;
+ *len = res;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static OSStatus
+pg_SSLSocketWrite(SSLConnectionRef conn, const void *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ OSStatus status;
+ int res;
+ Port *port = (Port *) conn;
+
+ res = secure_raw_write(port, data, *len);
+
+ if (res < 0)
+ {
+ switch (errno)
+ {
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ case EAGAIN:
+#endif
+#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (!defined(EAGAIN) || (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN))
+ case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#endif
+ case EINTR:
+ status = errSSLWouldBlock;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ status = errSSLClosedAbort;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ *len = res;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = noErr;
+ *len = res;
+ }
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Internal functions - Misc */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * KeychainEnsureValid
+ * Ensure the validity of using the passed Keychain array
+ *
+ * Any consumers of the Keychain array should always call this to ensure that
+ * it is set up in a manner that reflect the configuration. If it not, then
+ * this function will fatally error out as all codepaths should assume that
+ * setup has been done correctly and that there is no recovery in case it
+ * hasn't.
+ */
+static void
+KeychainEnsureValid(CFArrayRef *keychains)
+{
+ int keychain_count;
+
+ /*
+ * If the keychain array is unallocated, we must be allowed to use the
+ * default user Keychain, as that will be the effect of passing NULL to the
+ * Keychain search API. If not, error out.
+ */
+ if (*keychains == NULL)
+ {
+ if (!ssl_keychain_use_default)
+ goto error;
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ keychain_count = CFArrayGetCount(*keychains);
+
+ /*
+ * If we have one Keychain loaded then we must have a Keychain file
+ * configured, and not be allowed to use the default Keychain. If we have
+ * two then we must have a Keychain file configured *and* be allowed to use
+ * the default user Keychain. If we have any other number of Keychains in
+ * the array then we definitely have an incorrect situation.
+ */
+ if (keychain_count == 1)
+ {
+ if (ssl_keychain_file[0] == '\0')
+ goto error;
+
+ return;
+ }
+ else if (keychain_count == 2)
+ {
+ if (ssl_keychain_file[0] == '\0' || !ssl_keychain_use_default)
+ goto error;
+
+ return;
+ }
+ else
+ /* Fallthrough to erroring out */
+
+error:
+ ereport(FATAL,
+ (errmsg("Incorrect loading of Keychains detected")));
+}
diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
index d349d7c..21d5eb4 100644
--- a/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
+++ b/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c
@@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ char *ssl_crl_file;
char *ssl_dh_params_file;
char *ssl_passphrase_command;
bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
+#ifdef USE_SECURETRANSPORT
+char *ssl_keychain_file;
+bool ssl_keychain_use_default = false;
+#endif
#ifdef USE_SSL
bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
index e9f542c..c4a3925 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/guc.c
@@ -511,6 +511,7 @@ static char *locale_ctype;
static char *server_encoding_string;
static char *server_version_string;
static int server_version_num;
+static char *ssl_library_string;
static char *timezone_string;
static char *log_timezone_string;
static char *timezone_abbreviations_string;
@@ -1830,6 +1831,17 @@ static struct config_bool ConfigureNamesBool[] =
true,
NULL, NULL, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_SECURETRANSPORT
+ {
+ {"ssl_keychain_use_default", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Allow using the default Keychain of the current user."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_keychain_use_default,
+ false,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
/* End-of-list marker */
{
@@ -3517,6 +3529,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
},
{
+ /* Can't be set in postgresql.conf */
+ {"ssl_library", PGC_INTERNAL, PRESET_OPTIONS,
+ gettext_noop("Shows the SSL library used."),
+ NULL,
+ GUC_REPORT | GUC_NOT_IN_SAMPLE | GUC_DISALLOW_IN_FILE
+ },
+ &ssl_library_string,
+ SSL_LIBRARY,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+
+ {
/* Not for general use --- used by SET ROLE */
{"role", PGC_USERSET, UNGROUPED,
gettext_noop("Sets the current role."),
@@ -3778,6 +3802,18 @@ static struct config_string ConfigureNamesString[] =
NULL, NULL, NULL
},
+#ifdef USE_SECURETRANSPORT
+ {
+ {"ssl_keychain_file", PGC_SIGHUP, CONN_AUTH_SSL,
+ gettext_noop("Location of the Keychain file."),
+ NULL
+ },
+ &ssl_keychain_file,
+ "",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL
+ },
+#endif
+
{
{"stats_temp_directory", PGC_SIGHUP, STATS_COLLECTOR,
gettext_noop("Writes temporary statistics files to the specified directory."),
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/misc/postgresql.conf.sample b/src/backend/utils/misc/postgresql.conf.sample
index 4e61bc6..eb19aa0 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/misc/postgresql.conf.sample
+++ b/src/backend/utils/misc/postgresql.conf.sample
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
#ssl_dh_params_file = ''
#ssl_passphrase_command = ''
#ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload = off
+#ssl_keychain_file = ''
#------------------------------------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/src/include/common/securetransport.h b/src/include/common/securetransport.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d3a38e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/securetransport.h
@@ -0,0 +1,514 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * securetransport_common.h
+ * Apple Secure Transport support
+ *
+ * These definitions are used by both frontend and backend code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2017, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/include/common/securetransport.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef SECURETRANSPORT_H
+#define SECURETRANSPORT_H
+
+#include <Security/SecureTransport.h>
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLciphername
+ *
+ * Translate a SSLCipherSuite code into a string literal suitable for printing
+ * in log/informational messages to the user. Since this implementation of the
+ * Secure Transport lib doesn't support SSLv2/v3 these ciphernames are omitted.
+ *
+ * The SSLCipherSuite enum is defined in Security/CipherSuite.h
+ *
+ * This only removes the TLS_ portion of the SSLCipherSuite enum label for the
+ * ciphers to match what most Secure Transport implementations seem to be doing
+ */
+static const char *
+pg_SSLciphername(SSLCipherSuite cipher)
+{
+ switch (cipher)
+ {
+ case TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL:
+ return "NULL";
+
+ /* TLS addenda using AES, per RFC 3268 */
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return "RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return "RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA";
+
+ /* ECDSA addenda, RFC 4492 */
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ return "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ return "ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return "ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return "ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA";
+
+ /* Server provided RSA certificate for key exchange. */
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5:
+ return "RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5";
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ return "RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA";
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5:
+ return "RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5";
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return "RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA";
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return "RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256:
+ return "RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256";
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256";
+
+ /*
+ * Server-authenticated (and optionally client-authenticated)
+ * Diffie-Hellman.
+ */
+ case TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256";
+
+ /* Completely anonymous Diffie-Hellman */
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5:
+ return "DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5";
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256";
+
+ /* Addendum from RFC 4279, TLS PSK */
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return "PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA";
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return "PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return "PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return "PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return "DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA";
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return "DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return "RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA";
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return "RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return "RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA";
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return "RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA";
+
+ /* RFC 4785, Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption */
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ return "PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA";
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ return "DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA";
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA:
+ return "RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA";
+
+ /*
+ * Addenda from RFC 5288, AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites
+ * for TLS.
+ */
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return "RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return "RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384";
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return "DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return "DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384";
+ case TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return "DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return "DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384";
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return "DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return "DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384";
+ case TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return "DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return "DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384";
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return "DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return "DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384";
+
+ /* RFC 5487 - PSK with SHA-256/384 and AES GCM */
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return "PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return "PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384";
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return "DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return "DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384";
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return "RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return "RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384";
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ return "PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384";
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256:
+ return "PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256";
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384:
+ return "PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384";
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ return "DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384";
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256:
+ return "DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256";
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384:
+ return "DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384";
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ return "RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384";
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256:
+ return "RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256";
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384:
+ return "RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384";
+
+ /*
+ * Addenda from RFC 5289, Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
+ * HMAC SHA-256/384.
+ */
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ return "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384";
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ return "ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ return "ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384";
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return "ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256";
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ return "ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384";
+
+ /*
+ * Addenda from RFC 5289, Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
+ * SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)
+ */
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return "ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384";
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return "ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return "ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return "ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return "ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384";
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return "ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return "ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384";
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#ifndef FRONTEND
+/*
+ * pg_SSLcipherbits
+ *
+ * Return the number of bits in the encryption for the specified cipher.
+ * Ciphers with NULL encryption are omitted from the switch statement. This
+ * function is currently only used in the libpq backend.
+ */
+static int
+pg_SSLcipherbits(SSLCipherSuite cipher)
+{
+ switch (cipher)
+ {
+ /* TLS addenda using AES, per RFC 3268 */
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return 128;
+
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return 256;
+
+ /* ECDSA addenda, RFC 4492 */
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return 112;
+
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ return 128;
+
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return 256;
+
+ /* Server provided RSA certificate for key exchange. */
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return 112;
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5:
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return 128;
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ return 256;
+
+ /*
+ * Server-authenticated (and optionally client-authenticated)
+ * Diffie-Hellman.
+ */
+ case TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return 112;
+ case TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return 128;
+ case TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ return 256;
+
+ /* Completely anonymous Diffie-Hellman */
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return 112;
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5:
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return 128;
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256:
+ return 256;
+
+ /* Addendum from RFC 4279, TLS PSK */
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+ return 112;
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA:
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+ return 128;
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+ return 256;
+
+ /*
+ * Addenda from RFC 5288, AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites
+ * for TLS.
+ */
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return 128;
+
+ case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return 256;
+
+ /* RFC 5487 - PSK with SHA-256/384 and AES GCM */
+
+
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return 128;
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ case TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ case TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ return 256;
+
+ /*
+ * Addenda from RFC 5289, Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
+ * HMAC SHA-256/384.
+ */
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256:
+ return 128;
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384:
+ return 256;
+
+ /*
+ * Addenda from RFC 5289, Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
+ * SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)
+ */
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+ return 128;
+ case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+ return 256;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* SECURETRANSPORT_H */
diff --git a/src/include/common/sha2.h b/src/include/common/sha2.h
index f3fd0d0..6d35f47 100644
--- a/src/include/common/sha2.h
+++ b/src/include/common/sha2.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
#ifndef _PG_SHA2_H_
#define _PG_SHA2_H_
-#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_SSL) && defined(USE_OPENSSL)
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#endif
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
#define PG_SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (PG_SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
/* Context Structures for SHA-1/224/256/384/512 */
-#ifdef USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_SSL) && defined(USE_OPENSSL)
typedef SHA256_CTX pg_sha256_ctx;
typedef SHA512_CTX pg_sha512_ctx;
typedef SHA256_CTX pg_sha224_ctx;
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
index ef5528c..69aa93d 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq-be.h
@@ -22,6 +22,14 @@
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#elif USE_SECURETRANSPORT
+/*
+ * Ideally we should include the Secure Transport headers here but doing so
+ * cause namespace collisions with CoreFoundation on, among others "Size"
+ * and ACL definitions. To avoid polluting with workarounds, use void * for
+ * instead of the actual Secure Transport variables and perform type casting
+ * in the Secure Transport implementation.
+ */
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
@@ -183,12 +191,15 @@ typedef struct Port
bool peer_cert_valid;
/*
- * OpenSSL structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of other
- * fields are the same whether or not you build with OpenSSL.)
+ * SSL library structures. (Keep these last so that the locations of
+ * other fields are the same whether or not you build with SSL.)
*/
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
SSL *ssl;
X509 *peer;
+#elif USE_SECURETRANSPORT
+ void *ssl;
+ int ssl_buffered;
#endif
} Port;
@@ -214,7 +225,7 @@ CD1mpF1Bn5x8vYlLIhkmuquiXsNV6TILOwIBAg==\n\
/*
* These functions are implemented by the glue code specific to each
- * SSL implementation (e.g. be-secure-openssl.c)
+ * SSL implementation (e.g. be-secure-<implementation>.c)
*/
/*
@@ -269,6 +280,7 @@ extern void be_tls_get_peerdn_name(Port *port, char *ptr, size_t len);
*
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
+ * It's also not supported with Apple Secure Transport.
*/
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
#define HAVE_BE_TLS_GET_CERTIFICATE_HASH
diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
index 36baf6b..284e1cc 100644
--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
+++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h
@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ extern char *ssl_crl_file;
extern char *ssl_dh_params_file;
extern char *ssl_passphrase_command;
extern bool ssl_passphrase_command_supports_reload;
+#ifdef USE_SECURETRANSPORT
+extern char *ssl_keychain_file;
+extern bool ssl_keychain_use_default;
+#endif
extern int secure_initialize(bool isServerStart);
extern bool secure_loaded_verify_locations(void);
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config.h.in b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
index 5d40796..4fad10d 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config.h.in
+++ b/src/include/pg_config.h.in
@@ -932,6 +932,10 @@
/* Use replacement snprintf() functions. */
#undef USE_REPL_SNPRINTF
+/* Define to build with Apple Secure Transport support.
+ (--with-securetransport) */
+#undef USE_SECURETRANSPORT
+
/* Define to 1 to use software CRC-32C implementation (slicing-by-8). */
#undef USE_SLICING_BY_8_CRC32C
diff --git a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
index b036525..2731f82 100644
--- a/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
+++ b/src/include/pg_config_manual.h
@@ -162,11 +162,17 @@
/*
* USE_SSL code should be compiled only when compiling with an SSL
- * implementation. (Currently, only OpenSSL is supported, but we might add
- * more implementations in the future.)
+ * implementation.
*/
-#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) || defined(USE_SECURETRANSPORT)
#define USE_SSL
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL)
+#define SSL_LIBRARY "OpenSSL"
+#elif defined(USE_SECURETRANSPORT)
+#define SSL_LIBRARY "Secure Transport"
+#endif
+#else
+#define SSL_LIBRARY "None"
#endif
/*
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
index ec0122a..a021364 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/Makefile
@@ -57,6 +57,11 @@ else
OBJS += sha2.o
endif
+ifeq ($(with_securetransport), yes)
+OBJS += fe-secure-securetransport.o
+override CFLAGS += -framework Security -framework CoreFoundation -fconstant-cfstrings
+endif
+
ifeq ($(PORTNAME), cygwin)
override shlib = cyg$(NAME)$(DLSUFFIX)
endif
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
index 45bc067..a8ac764 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c
@@ -325,6 +325,16 @@ static const internalPQconninfoOption PQconninfoOptions[] = {
"Target-Session-Attrs", "", 11, /* sizeof("read-write") = 11 */
offsetof(struct pg_conn, target_session_attrs)},
+#if defined(USE_SECURETRANSPORT)
+ {"keychain_use_default", NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ "UseDefaultKeychain", "", 1,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, keychain_use_default)},
+
+ {"keychain", "PGKEYCHAIN", NULL, NULL,
+ "Keychain", "", 64,
+ offsetof(struct pg_conn, keychain)},
+#endif
+
/* Terminating entry --- MUST BE LAST */
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, 0}
@@ -3536,6 +3546,9 @@ makeEmptyPGconn(void)
conn->verbosity = PQERRORS_DEFAULT;
conn->show_context = PQSHOW_CONTEXT_ERRORS;
conn->sock = PGINVALID_SOCKET;
+#ifdef USE_SECURETRANSPORT
+ conn->keychain_use_default = true;
+#endif
/*
* We try to send at least 8K at a time, which is the usual size of pipe
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-securetransport.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-securetransport.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1a0455
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-securetransport.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1477 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * fe-secure-securetransport.c
+ * Apple Secure Transport support
+ *
+ *
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2018, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
+ *
+ *
+ * IDENTIFICATION
+ * src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure-securetransport.c
+ *
+ * NOTES
+ * Unlike the OpenSSL support there is no shared state between connections
+ * so there is no special handling for ENABLE_THREAD_SAFETY.
+ *
+ * There are a lot of functions (mostly the Core Foundation CF* family) that
+ * pass NULL as the first parameter. This is because they allow for a custom
+ * allocator to be used for memory allocations which is referenced with the
+ * first parameter. We are using the standard allocator however, and that
+ * means passing NULL all the time. Defining a suitably named preprocessor
+ * macro would aid readiblitity in case this is confusing (and/or ugly).
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+
+#include "postgres_fe.h"
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "libpq-fe.h"
+#include "fe-auth.h"
+#include "libpq-int.h"
+
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+#endif
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <Security/Security.h>
+#include <Security/SecureTransport.h>
+#include <CoreFoundation/CoreFoundation.h>
+#include "common/securetransport.h"
+
+
+#define KC_PREFIX "keychain:"
+#define KC_PREFIX_LEN (strlen("keychain:"))
+
+/*
+ * Private API call used in the Webkit code for creating an identity from a
+ * certificate with a key. While stable and used in many open source projects
+ * it should be replaced with a published API call since private APIs aren't
+ * subject to the same deprecation rules. Could potentially be replaced by
+ * using SecIdentityCreateWithCertificate() ?
+ */
+extern SecIdentityRef SecIdentityCreate(CFAllocatorRef allocator,
+ SecCertificateRef certificate,
+ SecKeyRef privateKey);
+
+static char * pg_SSLerrmessage(OSStatus errcode);
+static void pg_SSLerrfree(char *err_buf);
+static int pg_SSLsessionstate(PGconn *conn, char *msg, size_t len);
+
+static OSStatus pg_SSLSocketRead(SSLConnectionRef conn, void *data,
+ size_t *len);
+static OSStatus pg_SSLSocketWrite(SSLConnectionRef conn, const void *data,
+ size_t *len);
+static OSStatus pg_SSLOpenClient(PGconn *conn);
+static OSStatus pg_SSLLoadCertificate(PGconn *conn, CFArrayRef *cert_array,
+ CFArrayRef *key_array,
+ CFArrayRef *rootcert_array);
+
+static OSStatus import_certificate_keychain(const char *common_name,
+ SecCertificateRef *certificate,
+ CFArrayRef keychains,
+ char *hostname);
+static OSStatus import_identity_keychain(const char *common_name,
+ SecIdentityRef *identity,
+ CFArrayRef keychains);
+static OSStatus import_pem(const char *path, char *passphrase,
+ CFArrayRef *cert_arr);
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Public interface */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init_library
+ *
+ * Exported function to allow application to tell us it's already initialized
+ * Secure Transport and/or libcrypto. Since the current implementation only
+ * allow do_crypto be set for the OpenSSL backend, we should always get the
+ * same value passed in both variables.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_init_library(bool do_ssl, int do_crypto)
+{
+ Assert(do_ssl ? do_crypto : !do_crypto);
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_open_client
+ * Begin, or continue, negotiating a secure session.
+ */
+PostgresPollingStatusType
+pgtls_open_client(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ OSStatus open_status;
+ CFArrayRef certificate = NULL;
+ CFArrayRef key = NULL;
+ CFArrayRef rootcert = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * There is no API to load CRL lists in Secure Transport, they can however
+ * be imported into a Keychain with the commandline application "certtool".
+ * For libpq to use them, the certificate/key and root certificate needs to
+ * be using an identity in a Keychain into which the CRL have been
+ * imported. That needs to be documented.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcrl && strlen(conn->sslcrl) > 0)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("CRL files are not supported with Secure Transport\n"));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the SSL context hasn't been set up then initiate it, else continue
+ * with handshake
+ */
+ if (conn->ssl == NULL)
+ {
+ conn->ssl_key_bits = 0;
+ conn->ssl_buffered = 0;
+ conn->st_rootcert = NULL;
+
+ conn->ssl = SSLCreateContext(NULL, kSSLClientSide, kSSLStreamType);
+ if (!conn->ssl)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not create SSL context\n"));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ open_status = SSLSetProtocolVersionMin(conn->ssl, kTLSProtocol12);
+ if (open_status != noErr)
+ goto error;
+
+ open_status = SSLSetConnection(conn->ssl, conn);
+ if (open_status != noErr)
+ goto error;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the low level functions for reading and writing off a socket
+ */
+ open_status = SSLSetIOFuncs(conn->ssl, pg_SSLSocketRead, pg_SSLSocketWrite);
+ if (open_status != noErr)
+ goto error;
+
+ /*
+ * Load client certificate, private key, and trusted CA certs. The
+ * conn->errorMessage will be populated by the certificate loading
+ * so we can return without altering it in case of error.
+ */
+ if (pg_SSLLoadCertificate(conn, &certificate, &key, &rootcert) != noErr)
+ {
+ pgtls_close(conn);
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we are asked to verify the peer hostname, set it as a requirement
+ * on the connection. This must be set before calling SSLHandshake().
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "verify-full") == 0)
+ {
+ /* If we are asked to verify a hostname we dont have, error out */
+ if (!conn->pghost)
+ {
+ pgtls_close(conn);
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("hostname missing for verify-full\n"));
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+ }
+
+ SSLSetPeerDomainName(conn->ssl, conn->pghost, strlen(conn->pghost));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Perform handshake
+ */
+ open_status = pg_SSLOpenClient(conn);
+ if (open_status == noErr)
+ {
+ conn->ssl_in_use = true;
+ return PGRES_POLLING_OK;
+ }
+
+error:
+ if (open_status != noErr)
+ {
+ char *err_msg = pg_SSLerrmessage(open_status);
+ if (conn->errorMessage.len > 0)
+ appendPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext(", ssl error: %s\n"), err_msg);
+ else
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not establish SSL connection: %s\n"),
+ err_msg);
+ pg_SSLerrfree(err_msg);
+
+ pgtls_close(conn);
+ }
+
+ return PGRES_POLLING_FAILED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLOpenClient
+ * Validates remote certificate and performs handshake.
+ *
+ * If the user has supplied a root certificate we add that to the chain here
+ * before initiating validation. The caller is responsible for invoking error
+ * logging in the case of errors returned.
+ */
+static OSStatus
+pg_SSLOpenClient(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ OSStatus status;
+ SecTrustRef trust = NULL;
+ SecTrustResultType trust_eval = 0;
+ bool trusted = false;
+ bool only_anchor = true;
+
+ SSLSetSessionOption(conn->ssl, kSSLSessionOptionBreakOnServerAuth, true);
+
+ /*
+ * Call SSLHandshake until we get another response than errSSLWouldBlock.
+ * Busy-waiting is pretty silly, but what is commonly used for handshakes
+ * in Secure Transport. Setting an upper bound on retries should be done
+ * though, and perhaps a small timeout to play nice.
+ */
+ do
+ {
+ status = SSLHandshake(conn->ssl);
+ /* busy-wait loop */
+ }
+ while (status == errSSLWouldBlock || status == -1);
+
+ if (status != errSSLServerAuthCompleted)
+ return status;
+
+ /*
+ * Get peer server certificate and validate it. SSLCopyPeerTrust() is not
+ * supposed to return a NULL trust on noErr but have been reported to do
+ * in the past so add a belts-and-suspenders check
+ */
+ status = SSLCopyPeerTrust(conn->ssl, &trust);
+ if (status != noErr || trust == NULL)
+ return (trust == noErr ? errSecInternalError : status);
+
+ /*
+ * If we have our own root certificate configured then add it to the chain
+ * of trust and specify that it should be trusted.
+ */
+ if (conn->st_rootcert)
+ {
+ status = SecTrustSetAnchorCertificates(trust,
+ (CFArrayRef) conn->st_rootcert);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ return status;
+
+ /* We have a trusted local root cert, trust more than anchor */
+ only_anchor = false;
+ }
+
+ status = SecTrustSetAnchorCertificatesOnly(trust, only_anchor);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ return status;
+
+ status = SecTrustEvaluate(trust, &trust_eval);
+ if (status == errSecSuccess)
+ {
+ switch (trust_eval)
+ {
+ /*
+ * If 'Unspecified' then a valid anchor certificate was verified
+ * without encountering any explicit user trust. If 'Proceed' then
+ * the user has chosen to explicitly trust a certificate in the
+ * chain by clicking "Trust" in the Keychain app. Both cases are
+ * considered valid so trust the chain.
+ */
+ case kSecTrustResultUnspecified:
+ trusted = true;
+ break;
+ case kSecTrustResultProceed:
+ trusted = true;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * 'RecoverableTrustFailure' indicates that the certificate was
+ * rejected but might be trusted with minor changes to the eval
+ * context (ignoring expired certificate etc). For the verify
+ * sslmodes there is little to do here, but in require sslmode we
+ * can recover in some cases.
+ */
+ case kSecTrustResultRecoverableTrustFailure:
+ {
+ CFArrayRef trust_prop;
+ CFDictionaryRef trust_dict;
+ CFStringRef trust_error;
+ const char *error;
+
+ /* Assume the error is in fact not recoverable */
+ trusted = false;
+
+ /*
+ * In sslmode "require" we accept some certificate verification
+ * failures when we don't have a rootcert since MITM protection
+ * isn't enforced. Check the reported failure and trust in case
+ * the cert is missing, self signed or expired/future.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(conn->sslmode, "require") == 0 && !conn->st_rootcert)
+ {
+ trust_prop = SecTrustCopyProperties(trust);
+ trust_dict = CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(trust_prop, 0);
+ trust_error = CFDictionaryGetValue(trust_dict,
+ kSecPropertyTypeError);
+ if (trust_error)
+ {
+ error = CFStringGetCStringPtr(trust_error,
+ kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
+
+ /* Self signed, or missing CA */
+ if (strcmp(error, "CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_ANCHOR_CERT") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(error, "CSSMERR_TP_NOT_TRUSTED") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(error, "CSSMERR_TP_INVALID_CERT_AUTHORITY") == 0)
+ trusted = true;
+ /* Expired or future dated */
+ else if (strcmp(error, "CSSMERR_TP_CERT_EXPIRED") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(error, "CSSMERR_TP_CERT_NOT_VALID_YET") == 0)
+ trusted = true;
+ }
+
+ CFRelease(trust_prop);
+ }
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The below results are all cases where the certificate should be
+ * rejected without further questioning.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * 'Deny' means that the user has explicitly set the certificate to
+ * untrusted.
+ */
+ case kSecTrustResultDeny:
+ /* fall-through */
+ case kSecTrustResultInvalid:
+ /* fall-through */
+ case kSecTrustResultFatalTrustFailure:
+ /* fall-through */
+ case kSecTrustResultOtherError:
+ /* fall-through */
+ default:
+ trusted = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ CFRelease(trust);
+
+ if (!trusted)
+ return errSecNoAccessForItem;
+
+ /*
+ * If we reach here the documentation states we need to run the Handshake
+ * again after validating the trust
+ */
+ return pg_SSLOpenClient(conn);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read_pending
+ * Is there unread data waiting in the SSL read buffer?
+ */
+bool
+pgtls_read_pending(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ OSStatus read_status;
+ size_t len = 0;
+
+ read_status = SSLGetBufferedReadSize(conn->ssl, &len);
+
+ /*
+ * Should we get an error back then we assume that subsequent read
+ * operations will fail as well.
+ */
+ return (read_status == noErr && len > 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_read
+ * Read data from a secure connection.
+ *
+ * On failure, this function is responsible for putting a suitable message into
+ * conn->errorMessage. The caller must still inspect errno, but only to decide
+ * whether to continue or retry after error.
+ */
+ssize_t
+pgtls_read(PGconn *conn, void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ OSStatus read_status;
+ size_t n = 0;
+ ssize_t ret = 0;
+ int read_errno = 0;
+ char sess_msg[25];
+
+ /*
+ * Double-check that we have a connection which is in the correct state for
+ * reading before attempting to pull any data off the wire.
+ */
+ if (pg_SSLsessionstate(conn, sess_msg, sizeof(sess_msg)) == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL connection is: %s\n"), sess_msg);
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ read_status = SSLRead(conn->ssl, ptr, len, &n);
+ ret = (ssize_t) n;
+
+ switch (read_status)
+ {
+ case noErr:
+ break;
+
+ case errSSLWouldBlock:
+ /* Only set read_errno to EINTR iff we didn't get any data back */
+ if (n == 0)
+ read_errno = EINTR;
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Clean disconnections
+ */
+ case errSSLClosedNoNotify:
+ /* fall through */
+ case errSSLClosedGraceful:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL connection has been closed unexpectedly\n"));
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unrecognized SSL error %d\n"), read_status);
+ read_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(read_errno);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_write
+ * Write data to a secure connection.
+ *
+ * On failure, this function is responsible for putting a suitable message into
+ * conn->errorMessage. The caller must still inspect errno, but only to decide
+ * whether to continue or retry after error.
+ */
+ssize_t
+pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+ OSStatus write_status;
+ size_t n = 0;
+ ssize_t ret = 0;
+ int write_errno = 0;
+ char sess_msg[25];
+
+ /*
+ * Double-check that we have a connection which is in the correct state
+ * for writing before attempting to push any data on to the wire or the
+ * local SSL buffer.
+ */
+ if (pg_SSLsessionstate(conn, sess_msg, sizeof(sess_msg)) == -1)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL connection is: %s\n"), sess_msg);
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (conn->ssl_buffered > 0)
+ {
+ write_status = SSLWrite(conn->ssl, NULL, 0, &n);
+
+ if (write_status == noErr)
+ {
+ ret = conn->ssl_buffered;
+ conn->ssl_buffered = 0;
+ }
+ else if (write_status == errSSLWouldBlock || write_status == -1)
+ {
+ ret = 0;
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unrecognized SSL error: %d\n"), write_status);
+ ret = -1;
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ write_status = SSLWrite(conn->ssl, ptr, len, &n);
+ ret = n;
+
+ switch (write_status)
+ {
+ case noErr:
+ break;
+
+ case errSSLWouldBlock:
+ conn->ssl_buffered = len;
+ ret = 0;
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ write_errno = EAGAIN;
+#else
+ write_errno = EINTR;
+#endif
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Clean disconnections
+ */
+ case errSSLClosedNoNotify:
+ /* fall through */
+ case errSSLClosedGraceful:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("SSL connection has been closed unexpectedly\n"));
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("unrecognized SSL error %d\n"), write_status);
+ write_errno = ECONNRESET;
+ ret = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SOCK_ERRNO_SET(write_errno);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_init
+ * Initialize SSL system.
+ *
+ * There is little state or context to initialize for Secure Transport, the
+ * heavy lifting is performed by pgtls_open_client.
+ */
+int
+pgtls_init(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ conn->ssl_buffered = 0;
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pgtls_close
+ * Close SSL connection.
+ *
+ * This function must cope with connections in all states of disrepair since
+ * it will be called from pgtls_open_client to clean up any potentially used
+ * resources in case it breaks halfway.
+ */
+void
+pgtls_close(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ if (!conn->ssl)
+ return;
+
+ if (conn->st_rootcert != NULL)
+ CFRelease((CFArrayRef) conn->st_rootcert);
+
+ SSLClose(conn->ssl);
+ CFRelease(conn->ssl);
+
+ conn->ssl = NULL;
+ conn->ssl_in_use = false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLSocketRead
+ * The amount of read bytes is returned in the len variable
+ */
+static OSStatus
+pg_SSLSocketRead(SSLConnectionRef conn, void *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ OSStatus status = noErr;
+ int res;
+
+ res = pqsecure_raw_read((PGconn *) conn, data, *len);
+
+ if (res < 0)
+ {
+ switch (SOCK_ERRNO)
+ {
+ case ENOENT:
+ status = errSSLClosedGraceful;
+ break;
+
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ case EAGAIN:
+#endif
+#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (!defined(EAGAIN) || (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN))
+ case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#endif
+ case EINTR:
+ status = errSSLWouldBlock;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ *len = 0;
+ }
+ else
+ *len = res;
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static OSStatus
+pg_SSLSocketWrite(SSLConnectionRef conn, const void *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ OSStatus status = noErr;
+ int res;
+
+ res = pqsecure_raw_write((PGconn *) conn, data, *len);
+
+ if (res < 0)
+ {
+ switch (SOCK_ERRNO)
+ {
+#ifdef EAGAIN
+ case EAGAIN:
+#endif
+#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (!defined(EAGAIN) || (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN))
+ case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#endif
+ case EINTR:
+ status = errSSLWouldBlock;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *len = res;
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * import_identity_keychain
+ * Import the identity for the specified certificate from a Keychain
+ *
+ * Queries the specified Keychain, or the default unless not defined, for a
+ * identity with a certificate matching the passed certificate reference.
+ * Keychains are searched by creating a dictionary of key/value pairs with the
+ * search criteria and then asking for a copy of the matching entry/entries to
+ * the search criteria.
+ */
+static OSStatus
+import_identity_keychain(const char *common_name, SecIdentityRef *identity,
+ CFArrayRef keychains)
+{
+ OSStatus status = errSecItemNotFound;
+ CFMutableDictionaryRef query;
+ CFStringRef cert;
+ SecIdentityRef temp;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure the user didn't just specify keychain: as the sslcert config.
+ * The passed certificate will have the keychain prefix stripped so in that
+ * case the string is expected to be empty here.
+ */
+ if (strlen(common_name) == 0)
+ return errSecInvalidValue;
+
+ query = CFDictionaryCreateMutable(NULL, 0,
+ &kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks,
+ &kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks);
+
+ cert = CFStringCreateWithCString(NULL, common_name, kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
+
+ /*
+ * If we didn't get a Keychain passed, skip adding it to the dictionary
+ * thus prompting a search in the users default Keychain.
+ */
+ if (keychains)
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecMatchSearchList, keychains);
+
+ /*
+ * We don't need to set a kSecMatchLimit key since the default is to only
+ * return a single reference. Older versions of macOS had issues with
+ * certificate matching on labels, but we don't support older versions so
+ * no need to extract all and match ourselves.
+ */
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecClass, kSecClassIdentity);
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecReturnRef, kCFBooleanTrue);
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecMatchPolicy, SecPolicyCreateSSL(true, NULL));
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecAttrLabel, cert);
+
+ status = SecItemCopyMatching(query, (CFTypeRef *) &temp);
+
+ if (status == noErr)
+ *identity = (SecIdentityRef) CFRetain(temp);
+
+ CFRelease(query);
+ CFRelease(cert);
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static OSStatus
+import_certificate_keychain(const char *common_name, SecCertificateRef *certificate,
+ CFArrayRef keychains, char *hostname)
+{
+ OSStatus status = errSecItemNotFound;
+ CFMutableDictionaryRef query;
+ CFStringRef cert;
+ CFStringRef host = NULL;
+ CFArrayRef temp;
+ SecPolicyRef ssl_policy;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure the user didn't just specify the keychain prefix as the
+ * certificate config. The passed certificate will have the keychain
+ * prefix stripped so in that case the string is expected to be empty.
+ */
+ if (strlen(common_name) == 0)
+ return errSecInvalidValue;
+
+ query = CFDictionaryCreateMutable(NULL, 0,
+ &kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks,
+ &kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks);
+
+ cert = CFStringCreateWithCString(NULL, common_name, kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecAttrLabel, cert);
+
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecClass, kSecClassCertificate);
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecReturnRef, kCFBooleanTrue);
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecMatchLimit, kSecMatchLimitAll);
+
+ /*
+ * If we didn't get a set of Keychains passed, skip adding it to the
+ * dictionary thus prompting a search in the users default Keychain.
+ */
+ if (keychains)
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecMatchSearchList, keychains);
+
+ /*
+ * Specifying a hostname requires it to match the hostname in the leaf
+ * certificate.
+ */
+ if (hostname)
+ host = CFStringCreateWithCString(NULL, hostname, kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
+ ssl_policy = SecPolicyCreateSSL(true, host);
+ CFDictionaryAddValue(query, kSecMatchPolicy, ssl_policy);
+
+ /*
+ * Normally we could have used kSecMatchLimitOne in the above dictionary
+ * but since there are versions of macOS where the certificate matching on
+ * the label has been reported to not work (revisions of 10.12), we request
+ * all and find the one we want. Copy all the results to a temp array and
+ * scan it for the certificate we are interested in.
+ */
+ status = SecItemCopyMatching(query, (CFTypeRef *) &temp);
+ if (status == noErr)
+ {
+ for (i = 0; i < CFArrayGetCount(temp); i++)
+ {
+ SecCertificateRef search_cert;
+ CFStringRef cn;
+
+ search_cert = (SecCertificateRef) CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(temp, i);
+
+ if (search_cert != NULL)
+ {
+ SecCertificateCopyCommonName(search_cert, &cn);
+ if (CFStringCompare(cn, cert, 0) == kCFCompareEqualTo)
+ {
+ CFRelease(cn);
+ *certificate = (SecCertificateRef) CFRetain(search_cert);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ CFRelease(cn);
+ CFRelease(search_cert);
+ }
+ }
+
+ CFRelease(temp);
+ }
+
+ CFRelease(ssl_policy);
+ CFRelease(query);
+ CFRelease(cert);
+ if (host)
+ CFRelease(host);
+
+ return status;
+}
+
+static OSStatus
+import_pem(const char *path, char *passphrase, CFArrayRef *certificate)
+{
+ CFDataRef data_ref;
+ CFStringRef file_type;
+ SecExternalItemType item_type;
+ SecItemImportExportKeyParameters params;
+ SecExternalFormat format;
+ FILE *fp;
+ UInt8 *certdata;
+ struct stat buf;
+
+ if (!path || strlen(path) == 0)
+ return errSecInvalidValue;
+
+ if (stat(path, &buf) != 0)
+ {
+ if (errno == ENOENT || errno == ENOTDIR)
+ return -1;
+
+ return errSecInvalidValue;
+ }
+
+ fp = fopen(path, "r");
+ if (!fp)
+ return errSecInvalidValue;
+
+ certdata = malloc(buf.st_size);
+ if (!certdata)
+ {
+ fclose(fp);
+ return errSecAllocate;
+ }
+
+ if (fread(certdata, 1, buf.st_size, fp) != buf.st_size)
+ {
+ fclose(fp);
+ free(certdata);
+ return errSSLBadCert;
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ data_ref = CFDataCreate(NULL, certdata, buf.st_size);
+ free(certdata);
+
+ memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(SecItemImportExportKeyParameters));
+ params.version = SEC_KEY_IMPORT_EXPORT_PARAMS_VERSION;
+ /* Set OS default access control on the imported key */
+ params.flags = kSecKeyNoAccessControl;
+ if (passphrase)
+ params.passphrase = CFStringCreateWithCString(NULL, passphrase,
+ kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
+
+ /*
+ * Though we explicitly say this is a PEM file, Secure Transport will
+ * consider that a mere hint. Providing a file ending and a file format is
+ * what we can do to assist.
+ */
+ file_type = CFSTR(".pem");
+ if (!file_type)
+ return errSecAllocate;
+
+ format = kSecFormatPEMSequence;
+ item_type = kSecItemTypeCertificate;
+
+ return SecItemImport(data_ref, file_type, &format, &item_type,
+ 0 /* flags */, ¶ms, NULL /* keychain */,
+ certificate);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Secure Transport has the concept of an identity, which is a packaging of a
+ * private key and the certificate which contains the public key. The identity
+ * is what is used for verifying the connection, so we need to provide a
+ * SecIdentityRef identity to the API.
+ *
+ * A complete, and packaged, identity can be contained in a Keychain, in which
+ * case we can load it directly without having to create anything ourselves.
+ * In the case where we don't have a prepared identity in a Keychain, we need
+ * to create it from its components (certificate and key). The certificate must
+ * in that case be be located in a PEM file on the local filesystem. The key
+ * can either be in a PEM file or in the Keychain.
+ *
+ * While keeping identities in the Keychain is the macOS thing to do, we want
+ * to be functionally compatible with the OpenSSL support in libpq. Thus we not
+ * only need to support creating an identity from a private key contained in a
+ * PEM file, it needs to be the default. The order in which we discover the
+ * identity is:
+ *
+ * 1. Certificate and key in local files
+ * 2. Certificate in local file and key in Keychain
+ * 3. Identity in Keychain
+ *
+ * Since failures can come from multiple places, the PGconn errorMessage is
+ * populated here even for SSL library errors.
+ */
+static OSStatus
+pg_SSLLoadCertificate(PGconn *conn, CFArrayRef *cert_array,
+ CFArrayRef *key_array, CFArrayRef *rootcert_array)
+{
+ OSStatus status;
+ struct stat buf;
+ char homedir[MAXPGPATH];
+ char fnbuf[MAXPGPATH];
+ bool have_homedir;
+ bool cert_from_file = false;
+ char *ssl_err_msg;
+ SecIdentityRef identity = NULL;
+ SecCertificateRef cert_ref;
+ SecCertificateRef root_ref[1];
+ SecKeyRef key_ref = NULL;
+ CFArrayRef keychains = NULL;
+ SecKeychainRef kcref[2];
+ CFMutableArrayRef cert_connection;
+
+ /*
+ * If we have a keychain configured, open the referenced keychain as well
+ * as the default keychain and prepare an array with the references for
+ * searching. If no additional keychain is specified we don't need to open
+ * the default keychain and pass to searches since Secure Transport will
+ * use the default when passing NULL instead of an array of Keychain refs.
+ */
+ if (conn->keychain)
+ {
+ if (stat(conn->keychain, &buf) == 0)
+ {
+ status = SecKeychainOpen(conn->keychain, &kcref[0]);
+ if (status == noErr && kcref[0] != NULL)
+ {
+ SecKeychainStatus kcstatus;
+ status = SecKeychainGetStatus(kcref[0], &kcstatus);
+ if (status == noErr)
+ {
+ switch (kcstatus)
+ {
+ /*
+ * If the Keychain is already unlocked, readable or
+ * writeable, we don't need to do more. If not, try to
+ * unlock it.
+ */
+ case kSecUnlockStateStatus:
+ case kSecReadPermStatus:
+ case kSecWritePermStatus:
+ break;
+ default:
+ /*
+ * TODO: we need to get the passphrase from the
+ * user, but we currently don't have a good
+ * mechanism for that. For now, we assume a blank
+ * passphrase but we need to figure out a good way
+ * to have the user enter the passphrase.
+ */
+ SecKeychainUnlock(kcref[0], 0, "", TRUE);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We only need to open, and add, the default Keychain in case
+ * have a user keychain opened, else we will pass NULL to any
+ * keychain search which will use the default keychain by..
+ * default.
+ */
+ SecKeychainCopyDefault(&kcref[1]);
+ keychains = CFArrayCreate(NULL, (const void **) kcref, 2,
+ &kCFTypeArrayCallBacks);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We'll need the home directory if any of the relevant parameters are
+ * defaulted. If pqGetHomeDirectory fails, act as though none of the files
+ * could be found.
+ */
+ if (!(conn->sslcert && strlen(conn->sslcert) > 0) ||
+ !(conn->sslkey && strlen(conn->sslkey) > 0) ||
+ !(conn->sslrootcert && strlen(conn->sslrootcert) > 0))
+ have_homedir = pqGetHomeDirectory(homedir, sizeof(homedir));
+ else /* won't need it */
+ have_homedir = false;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to load the root cert from either a user defined keychain or the
+ * default Keychain in case none is specified
+ */
+ if (conn->sslrootcert &&
+ pg_strncasecmp(conn->sslrootcert, KC_PREFIX, KC_PREFIX_LEN) == 0)
+ {
+ root_ref[0] = NULL;
+ strlcpy(fnbuf, conn->sslrootcert + KC_PREFIX_LEN, sizeof(fnbuf));
+
+ import_certificate_keychain(fnbuf, &root_ref[0], keychains, NULL);
+
+ if (root_ref[0])
+ conn->st_rootcert = (void *) CFArrayCreate(NULL,
+ (const void **) root_ref,
+ 1, &kCFTypeArrayCallBacks);
+ }
+
+ if (!conn->st_rootcert)
+ {
+ if (conn->sslrootcert && strlen(conn->sslrootcert) > 0)
+ strlcpy(fnbuf, conn->sslrootcert, sizeof(fnbuf));
+ else if (have_homedir)
+ snprintf(fnbuf, sizeof(fnbuf), "%s/%s", homedir, ROOT_CERT_FILE);
+ else
+ fnbuf[0] = '\0';
+
+ if (fnbuf[0] != '\0')
+ {
+ if (stat(fnbuf, &buf) != 0)
+ {
+ /*
+ * stat() failed; assume root file doesn't exist. If sslmode is
+ * verify-ca or verify-full, this is an error. Otherwise, continue
+ * without performing any server cert verification.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslmode[0] == 'v') /* "verify-ca" or "verify-full" */
+ {
+ /*
+ * The only way to reach here with an empty filename is if
+ * pqGetHomeDirectory failed. That's a sufficiently unusual
+ * case that it seems worth having a specialized error message
+ * for it.
+ */
+ if (fnbuf[0] == '\0')
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not get home directory to locate root certificate
file\n"
+ "Either provide the file or change sslmode to disable server
certificateverification.\n"));
+ else
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("root certificate file \"%s\" does not exist\n"
+ "Either provide the file or change sslmode to disable server certificate
verification.\n"),fnbuf);
+ return errSecInternalError;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ status = import_pem(fnbuf, NULL, rootcert_array);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ {
+ ssl_err_msg = pg_SSLerrmessage(status);
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not load root certificate file \"%s\": %s\n"),
+ fnbuf, ssl_err_msg);
+ pg_SSLerrfree(ssl_err_msg);
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ if (*rootcert_array != NULL)
+ conn->st_rootcert = (void *) CFRetain(*rootcert_array);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the sslcert config is prefixed with a keychain identifier, the cert
+ * must be located in either the default or the specified keychain.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslcert &&
+ pg_strncasecmp(conn->sslcert, KC_PREFIX, KC_PREFIX_LEN) == 0)
+ {
+ strlcpy(fnbuf, conn->sslcert + KC_PREFIX_LEN, sizeof(fnbuf));
+
+ status = import_identity_keychain(fnbuf, &identity, keychains);
+
+ if (identity && status == noErr)
+ SecIdentityCopyPrivateKey(identity, &key_ref);
+ else
+ {
+ ssl_err_msg = pg_SSLerrmessage(status);
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not load certificate \"%s\" from keychain: %s\n"),
+ fnbuf, ssl_err_msg);
+ pg_SSLerrfree(ssl_err_msg);
+
+ return status;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * No prefix on the sslcert config, the certificate must thus reside in a
+ * file on disk.
+ */
+ else
+ {
+ if (conn->sslcert && strlen(conn->sslcert) > 0)
+ strlcpy(fnbuf, conn->sslcert, sizeof(fnbuf));
+ else if (have_homedir)
+ snprintf(fnbuf, sizeof(fnbuf), "%s/%s", homedir, USER_CERT_FILE);
+ else
+ fnbuf[0] = '\0';
+
+ if (fnbuf[0] != '\0')
+ {
+ status = import_pem(fnbuf, NULL, cert_array);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ {
+ if (status == -1)
+ return noErr;
+
+ ssl_err_msg = pg_SSLerrmessage(status);
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not load certificate file \"%s\": %s\n"),
+ fnbuf, ssl_err_msg);
+ pg_SSLerrfree(ssl_err_msg);
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ cert_ref = (SecCertificateRef) CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(*cert_array, 0);
+ cert_from_file = true;
+
+ /*
+ * We now have a certificate, so we need a private key as well in
+ * order to create the identity.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * The sslkey config is prefixed with keychain: indicating that the
+ * key should be loaded from Keychain instead of the filesystem.
+ * Search for the private key matching the cert_ref in the opened
+ * Keychains. If found, we get the identity returned.
+ */
+ if (conn->sslkey &&
+ pg_strncasecmp(conn->sslkey, KC_PREFIX, KC_PREFIX_LEN) == 0)
+ {
+ status = SecIdentityCreateWithCertificate(keychains, cert_ref,
+ &identity);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("certificate present, but private key \"%s\" not found in Keychain\n"),
+ fnbuf);
+ return errSecInternalError;
+ }
+
+ SecIdentityCopyPrivateKey(identity, &key_ref);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (conn->sslkey && strlen(conn->sslkey) > 0)
+ strlcpy(fnbuf, conn->sslkey, sizeof(fnbuf));
+ else if (have_homedir)
+ snprintf(fnbuf, sizeof(fnbuf), "%s/%s", homedir, USER_KEY_FILE);
+ else
+ fnbuf[0] = '\0';
+
+ /*
+ * If there is a matching file on the filesystem, require the
+ * key to be loaded from that file.
+ */
+ if (fnbuf[0] != '\0')
+ {
+
+ if (stat(fnbuf, &buf) != 0)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("certificate present, but not private key file \"%s\"\n"),
+ fnbuf);
+ return errSecInvalidKeyRef;
+ }
+#ifndef WIN32
+ if (!S_ISREG(buf.st_mode) || buf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO))
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("private key file \"%s\" has group or world access;
permissionsshould be u=rw (0600) or less\n"),
+ fnbuf);
+ return errSecInvalidKeyRef;
+ }
+#endif
+ status = import_pem(fnbuf, NULL, key_array);
+ if (status != noErr)
+ {
+ ssl_err_msg = pg_SSLerrmessage(status);
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not load private key file \"%s\": %s\n"),
+ fnbuf, ssl_err_msg);
+ pg_SSLerrfree(ssl_err_msg);
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ key_ref = (SecKeyRef) CFArrayGetValueAtIndex(*key_array, 0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We have certificate and a key loaded from files on disk, now we
+ * can create an identity from this pair.
+ */
+ if (key_ref)
+ identity = SecIdentityCreate(NULL, cert_ref, key_ref);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!identity)
+ {
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not create identity from certificate/key\n"));
+ return errSecInvalidValue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we have created the identity "by hand" without involving the
+ * Keychain we need to include the certificates in the array passed to
+ * SSLSetCertificate()
+ */
+ if (cert_from_file)
+ {
+ cert_connection = CFArrayCreateMutableCopy(NULL, 0, *cert_array);
+ CFArraySetValueAtIndex(cert_connection, 0, identity);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ cert_connection = CFArrayCreateMutable(NULL, 1L,
+ &kCFTypeArrayCallBacks);
+ CFArrayInsertValueAtIndex(cert_connection, 0,
+ (const void *) identity);
+ }
+
+ status = SSLSetCertificate(conn->ssl, cert_connection);
+
+ if (status != noErr)
+ {
+ ssl_err_msg = pg_SSLerrmessage(status);
+ printfPQExpBuffer(&conn->errorMessage,
+ libpq_gettext("could not set certificate for connection: (%d) %s\n"),
+ status, ssl_err_msg);
+ pg_SSLerrfree(ssl_err_msg);
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ if (key_ref)
+ {
+ conn->ssl_key_bits = SecKeyGetBlockSize(key_ref);
+ CFRelease(key_ref);
+ }
+
+ return noErr;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* SSL information functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+void *
+PQgetssl(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ /*
+ * Always return NULL as this is legacy and defined to be equal to
+ * PQsslStruct(conn, "OpenSSL");
+ */
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+PQsslStruct(PGconn *conn, const char *struct_name)
+{
+ if (!conn)
+ return NULL;
+ if (strcmp(struct_name, "SecureTransport") == 0)
+ return conn->ssl;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *const *
+PQsslAttributeNames(PGconn *conn)
+{
+ static const char *const result[] = {
+ "library",
+ "key_bits",
+ "cipher",
+ "protocol",
+ NULL
+ };
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+const char *
+PQsslAttribute(PGconn *conn, const char *attribute_name)
+{
+ SSLCipherSuite cipher;
+ SSLProtocol protocol;
+ OSStatus status;
+ const char *attribute = NULL;
+
+ if (!conn || !conn->ssl)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (strcmp(attribute_name, "library") == 0)
+ attribute = "SecureTransport";
+ else if (strcmp(attribute_name, "key_bits") == 0)
+ {
+ if (conn->ssl_key_bits > 0)
+ {
+ static char sslbits_str[10];
+ snprintf(sslbits_str, sizeof(sslbits_str), "%d", conn->ssl_key_bits);
+ attribute = sslbits_str;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(attribute_name, "cipher") == 0)
+ {
+ status = SSLGetNegotiatedCipher(conn->ssl, &cipher);
+ if (status == noErr)
+ return pg_SSLciphername(cipher);
+ }
+ else if (strcmp(attribute_name, "protocol") == 0)
+ {
+ status = SSLGetNegotiatedProtocolVersion(conn->ssl, &protocol);
+ if (status == noErr)
+ {
+ switch (protocol)
+ {
+ case kTLSProtocol11:
+ attribute = "TLSv1.1";
+ break;
+ case kTLSProtocol12:
+ attribute = "TLSv1.2";
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return attribute;
+}
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* Secure Transport Information Functions */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/*
+ * Obtain reason string for passed SSL errcode
+ */
+static char ssl_noerr[] = "no SSL error reported";
+static char ssl_nomem[] = "out of memory allocating error description";
+#define SSL_ERR_LEN 128
+
+static char *
+pg_SSLerrmessage(OSStatus errcode)
+{
+ char *err_buf;
+ const char *tmp;
+ CFStringRef err_msg;
+
+ if (errcode == noErr || errcode == errSecSuccess)
+ return ssl_noerr;
+
+ err_buf = malloc(SSL_ERR_LEN);
+ if (!err_buf)
+ return ssl_nomem;
+
+ err_msg = SecCopyErrorMessageString(errcode, NULL);
+ if (err_msg)
+ {
+ tmp = CFStringGetCStringPtr(err_msg, kCFStringEncodingUTF8);
+ strlcpy(err_buf, tmp, SSL_ERR_LEN);
+ CFRelease(err_msg);
+ }
+ else
+ snprintf(err_buf, sizeof(err_buf), _("SSL error code %d"), errcode);
+
+ return err_buf;
+}
+
+static void
+pg_SSLerrfree(char *err_buf)
+{
+ if (err_buf && err_buf != ssl_nomem && err_buf != ssl_noerr)
+ free(err_buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pg_SSLsessionstate
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the connection is open and -1 in case the connection is closed,
+ * or its status unknown. If msg is non-NULL the current state is copied with
+ * at most len - 1 characters ensuring a NUL terminated returned string.
+ */
+static int
+pg_SSLsessionstate(PGconn *conn, char *msg, size_t len)
+{
+ SSLSessionState state;
+ OSStatus status;
+ const char *status_msg;
+
+ /*
+ * If conn->ssl isn't defined we will report "Unknown" which it could be
+ * argued being correct or not, but since we don't know if there has ever
+ * been a connection at all it's not more correct to say "Closed" or
+ * "Aborted".
+ */
+ if (conn->ssl)
+ status = SSLGetSessionState(conn->ssl, &state);
+ else
+ {
+ status = errSecInternalError;
+ state = -1;
+ }
+
+ switch (state)
+ {
+ case kSSLConnected:
+ status_msg = "Connected";
+ status = 0;
+ break;
+ case kSSLHandshake:
+ status_msg = "Handshake";
+ status = 0;
+ break;
+ case kSSLIdle:
+ status_msg = "Idle";
+ status = 0;
+ break;
+ case kSSLClosed:
+ status_msg = "Closed";
+ status = -1;
+ break;
+ case kSSLAborted:
+ status_msg = "Aborted";
+ status = -1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ status_msg = "Unknown";
+ status = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (msg)
+ strlcpy(msg, status_msg, len);
+
+ return (status == noErr ? 0 : -1);
+}
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
index f7dc249..5fa6734 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-secure.c
@@ -157,8 +157,10 @@ void
PQinitOpenSSL(int do_ssl, int do_crypto)
{
#ifdef USE_SSL
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
pgtls_init_library(do_ssl, do_crypto);
#endif
+#endif
}
/*
diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
index bdd8f9d..94b56aa 100644
--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
+++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/libpq-int.h
@@ -80,6 +80,14 @@ typedef struct
#endif
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef USE_SECURETRANSPORT
+#define Size pg_Size
+#define uint64 pg_uint64
+#include <Security/Security.h>
+#undef Size
+#undef uint64
+#endif
+
/*
* POSTGRES backend dependent Constants.
*/
@@ -474,8 +482,19 @@ struct pg_conn
void *engine; /* dummy field to keep struct the same if
* OpenSSL version changes */
#endif
-#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
-#endif /* USE_SSL */
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
+
+#ifdef USE_SECURETRANSPORT
+ char *keychain;
+ bool keychain_use_default;
+
+ SSLContextRef ssl; /* SSL context reference */
+ void *st_rootcert;
+ ssize_t ssl_buffered;
+ int ssl_key_bits;
+#endif /* USE_SECURETRANSPORT */
+
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
#ifdef ENABLE_GSS
gss_ctx_id_t gctx; /* GSS context */
@@ -728,6 +747,7 @@ extern ssize_t pgtls_write(PGconn *conn, const void *ptr, size_t len);
*
* This is not supported with old versions of OpenSSL that don't have
* the X509_get_signature_nid() function.
+ * It's also not supported with Apple Secure Transport.
*/
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET_SIGNATURE_NID)
#define HAVE_PGTLS_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE_HASH
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/Makefile b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
index 97389c9..0c9b4cd 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/src/test/ssl/Makefile
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ top_builddir = ../../..
include $(top_builddir)/src/Makefile.global
export with_openssl
+export with_securetransport
CERTIFICATES := server_ca server-cn-and-alt-names \
server-cn-only server-single-alt-name server-multiple-alt-names \
@@ -130,6 +131,20 @@ ssl/root+server.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/server.crl
ssl/root+client.crl: ssl/root.crl ssl/client.crl
cat $^ > $@
+#### Keychains
+
+ifeq ($(with_securetransport),yes)
+
+KEYCHAINS := ssl/client.keychain
+
+# This target generates all Keychains
+keychains: $(KEYCHAINS)
+
+PWD=$(shell pwd)
+ssl/client.keychain: ssl/client.crt ssl/client.key
+ certtool i $(PWD)/ssl/client.crt c k=$(PWD)/ssl/client.keychain r=$(PWD)/ssl/client.key p=
+endif
+
.PHONY: sslfiles-clean
sslfiles-clean:
rm -f $(SSLFILES) ssl/client_ca.srl ssl/server_ca.srl ssl/client_ca-certindex* ssl/server_ca-certindex*
ssl/root_ca-certindex*ssl/root_ca.srl ssl/temp_ca.crt ssl/temp_ca_signed.crt
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/ServerSetup.pm b/src/test/ssl/ServerSetup.pm
index 3b451a3..2331939 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/ServerSetup.pm
+++ b/src/test/ssl/ServerSetup.pm
@@ -26,12 +26,22 @@ use Test::More;
use Exporter 'import';
our @EXPORT = qw(
+ set_backend
configure_test_server_for_ssl
switch_server_cert
test_connect_fails
test_connect_ok
);
+our $current_backend;
+
+sub set_backend
+{
+ my ($backend) = @_;
+
+ $current_backend = $backend;
+}
+
# Define a couple of helper functions to test connecting to the server.
# The first argument is a base connection string to use for connection.
@@ -56,7 +66,7 @@ sub test_connect_fails
{
local $Test::Builder::Level = $Test::Builder::Level + 1;
- my ($common_connstr, $connstr, $expected_stderr, $test_name) = @_;
+ my ($common_connstr, $connstr, $test_name, %expected_stderr) = @_;
my $cmd = [
'psql', '-X', '-A', '-t', '-c',
@@ -64,7 +74,7 @@ sub test_connect_fails
'-d', "$common_connstr $connstr"
];
- command_fails_like($cmd, $expected_stderr, $test_name);
+ command_fails_like($cmd, $expected_stderr{$current_backend}, $test_name);
return;
}
@@ -155,7 +165,14 @@ sub switch_server_cert
print $sslconf "ssl_ca_file='$cafile.crt'\n";
print $sslconf "ssl_cert_file='$certfile.crt'\n";
print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='$certfile.key'\n";
- print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ if (check_pg_config("#define USE_SECURETRANSPORT 1"))
+ {
+ print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file=''\n";
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ print $sslconf "ssl_crl_file='root+client.crl'\n";
+ }
close $sslconf;
$node->restart;
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
index 2b875a3..6352bb0 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/001_ssltests.pl
@@ -6,9 +6,34 @@ use Test::More;
use ServerSetup;
use File::Copy;
+# Some tests are backend specific, so store the currently used backend and
+# some particular capabilities which are interesting for the test
+my %tls_backend;
+
if ($ENV{with_openssl} eq 'yes')
{
- plan tests => 65;
+ $tls_backend{library} = 'openssl';
+ $tls_backend{library_name} = 'OpenSSL';
+ $tls_backend{tests} = 65;
+ $tls_backend{crl_support} = 1;
+ $tls_backend{keychain_support} = 0;
+}
+elsif ($ENV{with_securetransport} eq 'yes')
+{
+ $tls_backend{library} = 'securetransport';
+ $tls_backend{library_name} = 'Secure Transport';
+ $tls_backend{tests} = 68;
+ $tls_backend{crl_support} = 0;
+ $tls_backend{keychain_support} = 1;
+}
+else
+{
+ $tls_backend{library} = undef;
+}
+
+if (defined $tls_backend{library})
+{
+ plan tests => $tls_backend{tests};
}
else
{
@@ -25,6 +50,8 @@ my $SERVERHOSTADDR = '127.0.0.1';
# Allocation of base connection string shared among multiple tests.
my $common_connstr;
+set_backend($tls_backend{library});
+
# The client's private key must not be world-readable, so take a copy
# of the key stored in the code tree and update its permissions.
copy("ssl/client.key", "ssl/client_tmp.key");
@@ -52,7 +79,7 @@ $node->start;
# Run this before we lock down access below.
my $result = $node->safe_psql('postgres', "SHOW ssl_library");
-is($result, 'OpenSSL', 'ssl_library parameter');
+is($result, $tls_backend{library_name}, 'ssl_library parameter');
configure_test_server_for_ssl($node, $SERVERHOSTADDR, 'trust');
@@ -65,10 +92,28 @@ print $sslconf "ssl_key_file='server-password.key'\n";
print $sslconf "ssl_passphrase_command='echo wrongpassword'\n";
close $sslconf;
-command_fails(
- [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
- 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
-$node->_update_pid(0);
+if ($tls_backend{library} eq 'securetransport')
+{
+ command_ok(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart succeeds with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(1);
+
+ $common_connstr =
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=trustdb sslcert=invalid hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test";
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=require",
+ "connect without server root cert sslmode=require",
+ ( securetransport => qr/record overflow/ ));
+}
+else
+{
+ command_fails(
+ [ 'pg_ctl', '-D', $node->data_dir, '-l', $node->logfile, 'restart' ],
+ 'restart fails with password-protected key file with wrong password');
+ $node->_update_pid(0);
+}
open $sslconf, '>', $node->data_dir . "/sslconfig.conf";
print $sslconf "ssl=on\n";
@@ -98,8 +143,8 @@ $common_connstr =
# The server should not accept non-SSL connections.
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr, "sslmode=disable",
- qr/\Qno pg_hba.conf entry\E/,
- "server doesn't accept non-SSL connections");
+ "server doesn't accept non-SSL connections",
+ ( openssl => qr/\Qno pg_hba.conf entry\E/ ,securetransport => qr/\Qno pg_hba.conf entry\E/ ));
# Try without a root cert. In sslmode=require, this should work. In verify-ca
# or verify-full mode it should fail.
@@ -110,31 +155,50 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
- "connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+ "connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-ca",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ securetransport => qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/
+ ));
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=invalid sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
- "connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+ "connect without server root cert sslmode=verify-full",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/,
+ securetransport => qr/root certificate file "invalid" does not exist/
+ ));
# Try with wrong root cert, should fail. (We're using the client CA as the
# root, but the server's key is signed by the server CA.)
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=require",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require");
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=require",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/SSL error/,
+ securetransport => qr/The specified item has no access control/
+ ));
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca");
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-ca",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/SSL error/,
+ securetransport => qr/The specified item has no access control/
+ ));
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=ssl/client_ca.crt sslmode=verify-full",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full");
+ "connect with wrong server root cert sslmode=verify-full",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/SSL error/,
+ securetransport => qr/The specified item has no access control/
+ ));
# Try with just the server CA's cert. This fails because the root file
# must contain the whole chain up to the root CA.
test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=ssl/server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
- qr/SSL error/, "connect with server CA cert, without root CA");
+ "connect with server CA cert, without root CA",
+ ( openssl => qr/SSL error/, securetransport => qr/SSL error/));
# And finally, with the correct root cert.
test_connect_ok(
@@ -163,24 +227,36 @@ test_connect_ok(
# CRL tests
-# Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
- "sslcrl option with invalid file name");
-
-# A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "CRL belonging to a different CA");
-
-# With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
-test_connect_ok(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
- "CRL with a non-revoked cert");
+if ($tls_backend{crl_support})
+{
+ # Invalid CRL filename is the same as no CRL, succeeds
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "sslcrl option with invalid file name");
+
+ # A CRL belonging to a different CA is not accepted, fails
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/client.crl",
+ "CRL belonging to a different CA",
+ ( openssl => qr/SSL error/ ));
+
+ # With the correct CRL, succeeds (this cert is not revoked)
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "CRL with a non-revoked cert");
+}
+else
+{
+ # Test that the presence of a CRL configuration throws an error
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=invalid",
+ "unsupported sslcrl option",
+ ( securetransport => qr/CRL files are not supported/ ));
+}
# Check that connecting with verify-full fails, when the hostname doesn't
# match the hostname in the server's certificate.
@@ -198,8 +274,11 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=wronghost.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name "wronghost.test"\E/,
- "mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full");
+ "mismatch between host name and server certificate sslmode=verify-full",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/\Qserver certificate for "common-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name
"wronghost.test"\E/,
+ securetransport => qr/The specified item has no access control/
+ ));
# Test Subject Alternative Names.
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-multiple-alt-names');
@@ -223,13 +302,19 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name
"wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
- "host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names");
+ "host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host
name"wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ securetransport => qr/The specified item has no access control/
+ ));
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host name
"deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
- "host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard");
+ "host name not matching with X.509 Subject Alternative Names wildcard",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 2 other names) does not match host
name"deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ securetransport => qr/The specified item has no access control/
+ ));
# Test certificate with a single Subject Alternative Name. (this gives a
# slightly different error message, that's all)
@@ -246,14 +331,19 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name
"wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
- "host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name");
+ "host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name
"wronghost.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ securetransport => qr/The specified item has no access control/
+ ));
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name
"deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
- "host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard"
-);
+ "host name not matching with a single X.509 Subject Alternative Name wildcard",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/\Qserver certificate for "single.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" does not match host name
"deep.subdomain.wildcard.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ securetransport => qr/The specified item has no access control/
+ ));
# Test server certificate with a CN and SANs. Per RFCs 2818 and 6125, the CN
# should be ignored when the certificate has both.
@@ -273,8 +363,11 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host name
"common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
- "certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN");
+ "certificate with both a CN and SANs ignores CN",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/\Qserver certificate for "dns1.alt-name.pg-ssltest.test" (and 1 other name) does not match host
name"common-name.pg-ssltest.test"\E/,
+ securetransport => qr/The specified item has no access control/
+ ));
# Finally, test a server certificate that has no CN or SANs. Of course, that's
# not a very sensible certificate, but libpq should handle it gracefully.
@@ -289,8 +382,11 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"sslmode=verify-full host=common-name.pg-ssltest.test",
- qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
- "server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full");
+ "server certificate without CN or SANs sslmode=verify-full",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/could not get server's host name from server certificate/,
+ securetransport => qr/The specified item has no access control/
+ ));
# Test that the CRL works
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-revoked');
@@ -303,11 +399,46 @@ test_connect_ok(
$common_connstr,
"sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca",
"connects without client-side CRL");
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "does not connect with client-side CRL");
+if ($tls_backend{crl_support})
+{
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "does not connect with client-side CRL",
+ ( openssl => qr/SSL error/ ));
+}
+else
+{
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslrootcert=ssl/root+server_ca.crt sslmode=verify-ca sslcrl=ssl/root+server.crl",
+ "does not connect with client-side CRL",
+ ( securetransport => qr/CRL files are not supported with Secure Transport/ ));
+}
+
+# test Secure Transport keychain support
+if ($tls_backend{keychain_support})
+{
+ $common_connstr =
+ "user=ssltestuser dbname=certdb hostaddr=$SERVERHOSTADDR sslmode=verify-full";
+ # empty keychain
+ test_connect_fails($common_connstr,
+ "keychain=invalid",
+ "invalid Keychain file reference",
+ ( securetransport => qr/The specified item has no access control/ ));
+
+ # correct client cert in keychain with and without proper label
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "keychain=ssl/client.keychain",
+ "client cert in keychain but without label",
+ ( securetransport => qr/The specified item has no access control/ ));
+ test_connect_ok(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "sslcert=keychain:ssltestuser keychain=ssl/client.keychain",
+ "client cert in keychain");
+}
+
### Server-side tests.
###
@@ -322,8 +453,11 @@ $common_connstr =
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser sslcert=invalid",
- qr/connection requires a valid client certificate/,
- "certificate authorization fails without client cert");
+ "certificate authorization fails without client cert",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/connection requires a valid client certificate/,
+ securetransport => qr/connection requires a valid client certificate/
+ ));
# correct client cert
test_connect_ok(
@@ -335,23 +469,30 @@ test_connect_ok(
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key",
- qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key" has group or world access\E!,
- "certificate authorization fails because of file permissions");
+ "certificate authorization fails because of file permissions",
+ (
+ openssl => qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key" has group or world access\E!,
+ securetransport => qr!\Qprivate key file "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key" has group or world access\E!
+ ));
# client cert belonging to another user
test_connect_fails(
$common_connstr,
"user=anotheruser sslcert=ssl/client.crt sslkey=ssl/client_tmp.key",
- qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
- "certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user"
-);
+ "certificate authorization fails with client cert belonging to another user",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/,
+ securetransport => qr/certificate authentication failed for user "anotheruser"/
+ ));
-# revoked client cert
-test_connect_fails(
- $common_connstr,
- "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client-revoked.crt sslkey=ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key",
- qr/SSL error/,
- "certificate authorization fails with revoked client cert");
+if ($tls_backend{crl_support})
+{
+ test_connect_fails(
+ $common_connstr,
+ "user=ssltestuser sslcert=ssl/client-revoked.crt sslkey=ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key",
+ "certificate authorization fails with revoked client cert",
+ ( openssl => qr/SSL error/, securetransport => qr/SSL error/ ));
+}
# intermediate client_ca.crt is provided by client, and isn't in server's ssl_ca_file
switch_server_cert($node, 'server-cn-only', 'root_ca');
@@ -363,8 +504,13 @@ test_connect_ok(
"sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client+client_ca.crt",
"intermediate client certificate is provided by client");
test_connect_fails($common_connstr, "sslmode=require sslcert=ssl/client.crt",
- qr/SSL error/, "intermediate client certificate is missing");
+ "intermediate client certificate is missing",
+ (
+ openssl => qr/SSL error/,
+ securetransport => qr/certificate authentication failed/
+ ));
# clean up
unlink("ssl/client_tmp.key", "ssl/client_wrongperms_tmp.key",
"ssl/client-revoked_tmp.key");
+unlink("ssl/client.keychain") if ($tls_backend{keychain_support});
diff --git a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
index b460a7f..5c36bdd 100644
--- a/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
+++ b/src/test/ssl/t/002_scram.pl
@@ -8,7 +8,8 @@ use Test::More;
use ServerSetup;
use File::Copy;
-if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes')
+if ($ENV{with_openssl} ne 'yes' &&
+ $ENV{with_securetransport} ne 'yes')
{
plan skip_all => 'SSL not supported by this build';
}
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