Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net> writes:
> * Magnus Hagander (magnus@hagander.net) wrote:
>> Kerberos is not affected either, because the server does not get a copy
>> of the ticket. In theory it could be affected if the server requested a
>> delegation enabled ticket, and exported it so it could be used, but none
>> of these are done.
> That's quite a stretch even there, imv anyway... It'd have to be put
> somewhere a backend connecting would think to look for it, given that
> the user can't change the environment variables and whatnot (I don't
> think) of the backend process...
Hmm. I think what you are both saying is that if the remote end wants
Kerberos auth then you would expect a dblink connection to always fail.
If so, then we still seem to be down to the conclusion that there
are only three kinds of dblink connection:
* those that require a password;
* those that don't work;
* those that are insecure.
Would it be sensible to change dblink so that unless invoked by a
superuser, it fails any connection attempt in which no password is
demanded? I am not sure that this is possible without changes to libpq;
but ignoring implementation difficulties, is this a sane idea from
the standpoint of security and usability?
regards, tom lane