Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com> writes:
> On Wed, Jun 26, 2024 at 12:11 PM Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> wrote:
>> It is not, and I doubt we have any interest in dramatically expanding
>> the set of allowed password hashes. Adding SCRAM was enough work and
>> created a lot of client-v-server and cross-version incompatibility
>> already; nobody is in a hurry to repeat that. Moreover, I know of
>> no reason to think that SHA-256 isn't perfectly adequate.
> If history is any guide, every algorithm will eventually look too
> weak. It seems inevitable that we're going to have to keep changing
> algorithms as time passes. However, it seems like SCRAM is designed so
> that different hash functions can be substituted into it, so what I'm
> hoping is that we can keep SCRAM and just replace SCRAM-SHA-256 with
> SCRAM-WHATEVER when SHA-256 starts to look too weak.
Totally agreed, that day will come. What I'm pushing back on is the
suggestion that we should implement a ton of variant password hash
functionality on the basis of somebody's whim. The costs are large
and they are not all paid by us, so the bar to replacing any part
of that has to be very high.
> What I find a bit surprising about Anbazhagan's question is that he
> asks about PBKDF2, which seems to be part of SCRAM already.[1] In
> fact, I think all the things he lists are key derivation functions,
> not hash functions.
This I don't have any info about.
regards, tom lane