Re: pl/pgsql enabled by default
От | Simon Riggs |
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Тема | Re: pl/pgsql enabled by default |
Дата | |
Msg-id | 1115459227.3517.85.camel@localhost.localdomain обсуждение исходный текст |
Ответ на | Re: pl/pgsql enabled by default (Neil Conway <neilc@samurai.com>) |
Ответы |
Re: pl/pgsql enabled by default
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Список | pgsql-hackers |
On Sat, 2005-05-07 at 14:52 +1000, Neil Conway wrote: > Andrew Sullivan wrote: > > Sure it is. "Don't enable anything you don't need," is the first > > security rule. Everything is turned off by default. If you want it, > > enable it. > > So would you have us disable all the non-essential builtin functions? > (Many of which have has security problems in the past.) What about the > builtin encoding conversions, non-btree indexes, or a myriad of features > that not all users need or use? I support Andrew's comment, though might reword it to "Don't enable anything that gives users programmable features or user exits by default". You can't use the builtin encoding functions or non-btree indexes to access things you are not supposed to. Anything that is *always* there provides a platform for malware. I'm not really sure what is wrong with the CREATE LANGUAGE statement anyway - it is dynamically accessible, so doesn't require changes that effect other database instance users. I do understand the wish to make the lives of admins easier, but this isn't a hard thing to do... > What makes sense for the default configuration of an operating system > (which by nature must be hardened against attack) does not necessarily > make sense for a database system. Security is everybody's job, not just the OS guys. Personally, I forget that constantly, but the principle seems clear. Best Regards, Simon Riggs
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