Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers)
| От | Tom Lane |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers) |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | 10451.1339470190@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
| Ответ на | Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers) (Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com>) |
| Ответы |
Re: Restrict ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON NULL INPUT (was
Re: Not quite a security hole: CREATE LANGUAGE for non-superusers)
|
| Список | pgsql-hackers |
Noah Misch <noah@leadboat.com> writes:
>> CREATE FUNCTION + ALTER FUNCTION OWNER TO is useful for creating another
>> user's untrusted-language SECURITY DEFINER function. ALTER FUNCTION CALLED ON
>> NULL INPUT ought to require that the user be eligible to redefine the function
>> completely.
> Here's a patch implementing that restriction. To clarify, I see no need to
> repeat *all* the CREATE-time checks; for example, there's no need to recheck
> permission to use the return type. The language usage check is enough.
This seems bizarre and largely unnecessary. As you stated to begin
with, granting ownership of a function implies some degree of trust.
I do not want to get into the business of parsing exactly which variants
of ALTER FUNCTION ought to be considered safe. And I definitely don't
want to add a check that enforces restrictions against cases that have
got nothing whatever to do with C-language functions, as this patch
does.
regards, tom lane
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