pgsql/src backend/libpq/Makefile backend/libpq ...

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pgsql/src backend/libpq/Makefile backend/libpq ...

От:
momjian@postgresql.org (Bruce Momjian - CVS)
Дата:
CVSROOT:	/cvsroot
Module name:	pgsql
Changes by:	momjian@postgresql.org	02/06/13 23:56:47

Modified files:
	src/backend/libpq: Makefile pqcomm.c 
	src/backend/postmaster: postmaster.c 
	src/bin/psql   : startup.c 
	src/include/libpq: libpq-be.h 
	src/interfaces/libpq: Makefile fe-connect.c fe-misc.c 
	                      libpq-int.h 
Added files:
	src/interfaces/libpq: fe-ssl.c 
	src/interfaces/ssl: client.conf mkcert.sh pgkeygen.sh root.conf 
	                    server.conf 

Log message:
	Attached are a revised set of SSL patches.  Many of these patches
	are motivated by security concerns, it's not just bug fixes.  The key
	differences (from stock 7.2.1) are:
	
	*) almost all code that directly uses the OpenSSL library is in two
	new files,
	
	src/interfaces/libpq/fe-ssl.c
	src/backend/postmaster/be-ssl.c
	
	in the long run, it would be nice to merge these two files.
	
	*) the legacy code to read and write network data have been
	encapsulated into read_SSL() and write_SSL().  These functions
	should probably be renamed - they handle both SSL and non-SSL
	cases.
	
	the remaining code should eliminate the problems identified
	earlier, albeit not very cleanly.
	
	*) both front- and back-ends will send a SSL shutdown via the
	new close_SSL() function.  This is necessary for sessions to
	work properly.
	
	(Sessions are not yet fully supported, but by cleanly closing
	the SSL connection instead of just sending a TCP FIN packet
	other SSL tools will be much happier.)
	
	*) The client certificate and key are now expected in a subdirectory
	of the user's home directory.  Specifically,
	
	- the directory .postgresql must be owned by the user, and
	allow no access by 'group' or 'other.'
	
	- the file .postgresql/postgresql.crt must be a regular file
	owned by the user.
	
	- the file .postgresql/postgresql.key must be a regular file
	owned by the user, and allow no access by 'group' or 'other'.
	
	At the current time encrypted private keys are not supported.
	There should also be a way to support multiple client certs/keys.
	
	*) the front-end performs minimal validation of the back-end cert.
	Self-signed certs are permitted, but the common name *must*
	match the hostname used by the front-end.  (The cert itself
	should always use a fully qualified domain name (FDQN) in its
	common name field.)
	
	This means that
	
	psql -h eris db
	
	will fail, but
	
	psql -h eris.example.com db
	
	will succeed.  At the current time this must be an exact match;
	future patches may support any FQDN that resolves to the address
	returned by getpeername(2).
	
	Another common "problem" is expiring certs.  For now, it may be
	a good idea to use a very-long-lived self-signed cert.
	
	As a compile-time option, the front-end can specify a file
	containing valid root certificates, but it is not yet required.
	
	*) the back-end performs minimal validation of the client cert.
	It allows self-signed certs.  It checks for expiration.  It
	supports a compile-time option specifying a file containing
	valid root certificates.
	
	*) both front- and back-ends default to TLSv1, not SSLv3/SSLv2.
	
	*) both front- and back-ends support DSA keys.  DSA keys are
	moderately more expensive on startup, but many people consider
	them preferable than RSA keys.  (E.g., SSH2 prefers DSA keys.)
	
	*) if /dev/urandom exists, both client and server will read 16k
	of randomization data from it.
	
	*) the server can read empheral DH parameters from the files
	
	$DataDir/dh512.pem
	$DataDir/dh1024.pem
	$DataDir/dh2048.pem
	$DataDir/dh4096.pem
	
	if none are provided, the server will default to hardcoded
	parameter files provided by the OpenSSL project.
	
	Remaining tasks:
	
	*) the select() clauses need to be revisited - the SSL abstraction
	layer may need to absorb more of the current code to avoid rare
	deadlock conditions.  This also touches on a true solution to
	the pg_eof() problem.
	
	*) the SIGPIPE signal handler may need to be revisited.
	
	*) support encrypted private keys.
	
	*) sessions are not yet fully supported.  (SSL sessions can span
	multiple "connections," and allow the client and server to avoid
	costly renegotiations.)
	
	*) makecert - a script that creates back-end certs.
	
	*) pgkeygen - a tool that creates front-end certs.
	
	*) the whole protocol issue, SASL, etc.
	
	*) certs are fully validated - valid root certs must be available.
	This is a hassle, but it means that you *can* trust the identity
	of the server.
	
	*) the client library can handle hardcoded root certificates, to
	avoid the need to copy these files.
	
	*) host name of server cert must resolve to IP address, or be a
	recognized alias.  This is more liberal than the previous
	iteration.
	
	*) the number of bytes transferred is tracked, and the session
	key is periodically renegotiated.
	
	*) basic cert generation scripts (mkcert.sh, pgkeygen.sh).  The
	configuration files have reasonable defaults for each type
	of use.
	
	Bear Giles

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