Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us> writes:
> As far as protocol version goes, I think our existing coding basically
> says "prefer newest available version, but at least TLS 1.0". I think
> that's probably a reasonable approach.
The client side forces TLS 1.0:
SSL_context = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method());
In typical OpenSSL fashion, this does *not* mean 1.0 or higher. It
means 1.0 exactly.
> If the patch exposed a GUC that set a "minimum" version, rather than
> calling out specific acceptable protocols, it might be less risky.
Not necessarily. Someone might find a weakness in TLS 1.1 which is not
present in 1.0 because it involves a specific algorithm or mode that 1.0
does not support.
DES
--
Dag-Erling Smørgrav - des@des.no