Re: [v9.3] Row-Level Security
| От | Tom Lane |
|---|---|
| Тема | Re: [v9.3] Row-Level Security |
| Дата | |
| Msg-id | 13017.1340744395@sss.pgh.pa.us обсуждение исходный текст |
| Ответ на | Re: [v9.3] Row-Level Security (Kohei KaiGai <kaigai@kaigai.gr.jp>) |
| Ответы |
Re: [v9.3] Row-Level Security
|
| Список | pgsql-hackers |
Kohei KaiGai <kaigai@kaigai.gr.jp> writes:
> 2012/6/26 Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>:
>> I think you're missing the point. �Everyone who has commented on this
>> issue is in favor of having some check that causes the RLS predicate
>> *not to get added in the first place*.
> Here is a simple idea to avoid the second problematic scenario; that
> assign 0 as cost of has_superuser_privilege().
I am not sure which part of "this isn't safe" isn't getting through to
you. Aside from the scenarios Robert mentioned, consider the
possibility that f_malicious() is marked immutable, so that the planner
is likely to call it (to replace the call with its value) before it will
ever think about whether has_superuser_privilege should be called first.
Please just do what everybody is asking for, and create a bypass that
does not require fragile, easily-broken-by-future-changes assumptions
about what the planner will do with a WHERE clause.
regards, tom lane
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