Re: MD5 authentication needs help

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От
Heikki Linnakangas
Тема
Re: MD5 authentication needs help
Дата
Msg-id
54F759DE.2020109@iki.fi
Ответ на
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Дерево обсуждения
MD5 authentication needs help Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Andres Freund <andres@2ndquadrant.com>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Andres Freund <andres@2ndquadrant.com>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Jim Nasby <Jim.Nasby@BlueTreble.com>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Jim Nasby <Jim.Nasby@BlueTreble.com>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Greg Stark <stark@mit.edu>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Albe Laurenz <laurenz.albe@wien.gv.at>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Bruce Momjian <bruce@momjian.us>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stefan Kaltenbrunner <stefan@kaltenbrunner.cc>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Robert Haas <robertmhaas@gmail.com>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Magnus Hagander <magnus@hagander.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Heikki Linnakangas <hlinnaka@iki.fi>
Re: MD5 authentication needs help Stephen Frost <sfrost@snowman.net>
On 03/04/2015 08:59 PM, Stephen Frost wrote:
> * Heikki Linnakangas (hlinnaka@iki.fi) wrote:
>> The big difference between SRP and SCRAM is that if you eavesdrop
>> the SCRAM handshake, you can use that information to launch a
>> brute-force or dictionary attack. With SRP, you cannot do that. That
>> makes it relatively safe to use weak passwords with SRP, which is
>> not the case with SCRAM (nor MD5)
>
> Thanks for the info!
>
> Looking around a bit, one issue with SRP (as pointed out by Simon
> Josefsson, the author of the SCRAM implementation for GNU SASL) is that
> the username is included in the verifier (similar to our implementation
> today with MD5) meaning that the stored data on the server is no longer
> valid if the username is changed.  Obviously, our users are used to
> that, but it's still something to be considered.

Yes, good point, that's yet another thing that needs to be considered.

> One question though- isn't the iteration option to SCRAM intended to
> address the dictionary/brute force risk?  SRP uses an exponentiation
> instead of iterations but it's unclear to me if one is really strictly
> better or worse than the other (nor have I found any discussion of that
> comparison) for this vector.

Not sure what you mean. Yes, the iterations option in SCRAM is designed 
to make brute forcing more expensive. For both a captured authentication 
handshake, or if you steal a backup tape.

I'm not sure how expensive a brute force attack on SRP would be, using a 
stolen backup tape. There doesn't seem to be an iterations count similar 
to SCRAM. But note that SRP's resistance to brute-forcing the 
authentication handshake is of a different kind. It's not just 
expensive, but outright impossible. (Don't ask me how that works; I'm 
not well-versed in the maths involved.) That's a big advantage because 
it means that it's OK to use a fairly weak password like 'foobar123' 
that would be trivially cracked with a dictionary attack. (You can still 
connect to the server and try different passwords, but the server can 
log that and throttle how many guesses / minute it let's you do)

- Heikki



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